



Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-102
Friday
24 May 1996

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-102

CONTENTS

24 May 1996

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Balkans: Dayton Signatories To Meet in Geneva on 2 Jun [TANJUG]	1
---	---

ALBANIA

Albania: Leading Election Contenders Affirm Priority of U.S. Ties [AFP]	2
Albania: Party Leaders Hold Election Rallies in Districts [ATA]	2
Albania: PS Rally Disrupted, Deputy Chairman Assaulted [KOHA JONE 23 May]	3
Albania: Judge Rules 'Detention in Prison' for Communist Leaders [ATA]	4
Albania: Court Sentences 3 Ex-Communist Leaders to Death [AFP]	4

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Slovenia's Kucan Arrives on Official Visit [Ljubljana Radio]	5
Czech Republic: IFOR Mission To Cost More Than Expected [PRAVO 23 May]	5
Czech Republic: Political Aspect of Fighter Purchase Viewed [MLADA FRONTA DNES 23 May] ..	5
Czech Republic: Poll Suggests More Voters Undecided [MLADA FRONTA DNES 23 May]	6

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Interior Minister Survives No-Confidence Vote [Bratislava Radio]	8
Slovakia: Kovac Urges Removal of Interior Minister, SIS Head [Bratislava Radio]	8
Slovakia: Carnogursky, Slobodnik Differ on Foreign Policy [THE SLOVAK SPECTATOR 13-26 Mar] ..	8
Slovakia: Ratification of Hungarian Treaty Seen as Beginning [SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 16 May] ..	12
Slovakia: Wording of Penal Code Amendment Questioned [PRAGUE POST 26 Mar]	12
Slovakia: Implications of New Language Law Questioned [DOMINO EFEKT 29 Feb]	13
Slovakia: Poll Shows Even Coalition Supporters Distrust Police [PRAVDA 18 May]	14

HUNGARY

Hungary: Government Said Planning To Buy Swedish Aircraft [UJ MAGYARORSZAG 22 May]	16
--	----

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: EU Administrator: Mostar Elections To Be Held Mid-Jun [Madrid RNE]	18
B-H: Casado Says Mostar Refugees To Vote in Election [AFP]	18
B-H: Zubak Announces Agreement on Mostar Elections [TANJUG]	18
B-H: Report Claims Casado Forced Tudjman Into Mostar Accord [Sarajevo Radio]	18
B-H: Voters' Registration for Elections To Begin 8 Jun [TANJUG]	19
B-H: Zubak, UNHCR Envoy Discuss Return of Muslims to Stolac [BH PRESS]	19
B-H: Official Protests Handing Over 7 Muslims to Serbs [AFP]	20
B-H: Muratovic Criticizes Election Rules, IFOR [LJILJAN 15-22 May]	20
B-H: Bildt, Brcko Authorities Discuss Aid, Elections [Pale Radio]	23
B-H: Sacirbegovic: Foreign Fighters Issue 'Dealt' With [AFP]	23
B-H: Report Claims 50 Mujahidin Still in Zenica Area [VEECERNJI LIST 18 May]	23
B-H: Zvornik Council Warns Bildt, Smith of Serb Terrorism [Sarajevo Radio]	24
B-H: Steiner Confident Dayton Accords Will Be Attained [TANJUG]	24

B-H: Official Criticizes IFOR for Hypocrisy Over Detainees [BH PRESS]	25
B-H: Poll: Bosnians Believe IFOR Could Arrest War Criminals [AFP]	25
B-H: Germany's Ruehe Says IFOR Mission To 'End as Scheduled' [TANJUG]	25
B-H: IFOR Reportedly Approved Mladic's Flight to Belgrade [Ljubljana Radio]	26
B-H: Doboj, Teslic, Tesanj Officials Discuss Civilian Movement [TANJUG]	26
B-H: RS's Plavsic: Dayton Agreement Only Solution at Present [SRNA]	26
B-H: Plavsic Rules Out Karadzic's Extradition to The Hague [Pale TV]	27
B-H: Kasagic Said Arranging Karadzic Arrest in Zagreb [SVIJET 23 May]	27
B-H: Bildt: Karadzic's Actions May Lead to New Sanctions [AFP]	27
B-H: Pale Reports Foreign Press View of Karadzic's Position [Pale TV]	27
B-H: UN: Warrants Could Be Issued Against Karadzic, Mladic [TANJUG]	28
B-H: Bildt Appeals for More Pressure on Karadzic [AFP]	29
B-H: Serb Opposition Leader Says Karadzic 'Politically Dead' [TANJUG]	29
B-H: Zvornik Rally Voices Support for Karadzic, Mladic [Pale Radio]	29
B-H: Serb Speaker Comments on Referendum Issue [SRNA]	30
B-H: Bildt Tells Serbs Foreign Aid Tied to Peace Effort [AFP]	30
B-H: Serb Vice President Receives OSCE Official in Pale [TANJUG]	31
B-H: Serb Talks With Foreign Investors Called 'Unsuccessful' [SRNA]	31
B-H: Serbs Call for Ban of Interentity Bus Link [AFP]	31

CROATIA

Croatia: Eastern Slavonia Serbs Reportedly Shelled [Zagreb Radio]	33
Croatia: Vukovar Deputies Launch Special Status Initiative [TANJUG]	33
Croatia: Serb Predicts Direct Talks With Zagreb on E. Slavonia [TANJUG]	33
Croatia: Steiner Says Mostar Elections Might Be Postponed [TANJUG]	34
Croatia: 'Stages' of Srem-Baranja Demilitarization Detailed [TANJUG]	34
Croatia: Vukovar Assembly Proposes 'Autonomous Status' [Belgrade Radio]	35
Croatia: Serb 'Executive Council' Criticizes Amnesty Law [Beli Manastir Radio]	35
Croatia: Serbs Link Return of Croatian Refugees to Amnesty Law [TANJUG]	36
Croatia: Russian Envoy Calls Amnesty Law 'Negative' [TANJUG]	37
Croatia: IFOR Sets Up Bridge Between Croatia, Serb Bosnia [Zagreb Radio]	37

POLAND

Poland: Interview With Polish President Kwasniewski [Dublin THE IRISH TIMES 22 May]	38
Poland: Recent Moscow Military Talks Analyzed [RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 May]	39
Poland: Defense Minister on Military Exercises With Russia [RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 May]	41
Poland: Official Views State Security Policy [RZECZPOSPOLITA 20 May]	42
Poland: Military Secret Services Chief Interviewed [POLSKA ZBROJNA 20 May]	44

ROMANIA

Romania: Roman Refutes Russian Objections to NATO Expansion [JURNALUL NATIONAL 20 May]	46
Romania: SRI Director Denies Involvement in Wiretapping [EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 16 May]	47

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: Drnovsek Favors Extending IFOR in Bosnia [Brussels LE SOIR 23 May]	50
Slovenia: Drnovsek Comments on Talks About EU With Prodi [Ljubljana Radio]	51
Slovenia: Peterle on Candidate for Foreign Ministry Post [Ljubljana Radio]	51
Slovenia: Army Shows Off Radars of Undisclosed Origin [DNEVNIK 13 May]	52

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Moscow Denies Primakov's Visit Linked to Karadzic [INTERFAX]	53
---	----

FRY: Talks To Resume on Succession, Division of Assets [TANJUG]	53
FRY: Agreements on Telecommunications Signed With Skopje [Belgrade Radio]	53
FRY: National, Balkan News Agencies Discuss Cooperation [TANJUG]	54
FRY: Army Holds Land, Sea, Air Exercise in Montenegro [BORBA 15 May]	54
FRY: Bank Official Says No Reason To Fear Inflation [TANJUG]	55
FRY: Banks Allegedly Issue Money Without Authorization [TELEGRAF 22 May]	55

Serbia

Serbia: Workers Protest, Trust Only Avramovic [NASA BORBA 15 May]	56
Serbia: U.S., Germany Seen as Markets for Arms Industry [BORBA 17 May]	56

Montenegro

Montenegro: Liberals Criticize Serb Decision on Airline [Belgrade Radio]	57
--	----

Kosovo

Kosovo: U.S. Office in Pristina Seen as Step to Talks [ATA]	57
Kosovo: Commentary on U.S. 'Reinvolvement' in Province [RILINDJA 22 May]	58
Kosovo: Serb Refugees From Romania Settled in Klima [KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]	59
Kosovo: Blaku Calls Repatriation Plans 'Premature' [KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]	59
Kosovo: Commentary Plays Down Fear of Repatriation [Zurich BOTA SOT 22 May]	59
Kosovo: Text of Ruling on Postponement of Elections [KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]	60
Kosovo: 'Parliament' Urges End to 'Exploitation' [KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]	60
Kosovo: Antitax Strike by Vendors Continues [KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]	61
Kosovo: Serb Workers Hold Protest Rally in Pec [KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]	61

Balkans: Dayton Signatories To Meet in Geneva on 2 Jun

LD2305214696 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2024 GMT 23 May 96

[By Stevan Cordas]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, May 23 (TANJUG)—The U.S. mission at the U.N. headquarters in Geneva confirmed Thursday that another meeting of Dayton Accord signatories would be held in its premises on June 2, but did not disclose its agenda. United States, as host of the meeting to be chaired by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, has invited Serbian and Croatian Presidents Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic.

The meeting will also be attended by representatives of the five member-states of the contact group U.S., France, Britain, Germany and Russia.

Other figures connected with the peace accords are also expected to attend, above all the coordinator of the civilian section of the accord, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt.

At the last meeting of the chief protagonists of the Dayton process last March in Geneva, Christopher had announced a series of meetings of representatives of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska.

Two documents were adopted at the March meeting—on the consolidation of the Muslim-Croat Federation and on the implementation of the civilian component of the Dayton accord.:

Little has however been fulfilled as regards the consolidation of the federation, and the implementation of the civilian component still lags behind the military one, it was noted in Geneva.

These two issues are therefore expected to be the focus of attention at the forthcoming meeting in Geneva, along with the elections in Bosnia scheduled for September 14.

The U.S. considers elections as the most important segment of the peace accord, but it is feared that they would not be held as scheduled.

The fears are mainly due to the latest statements by Muslim leaders Alija Izetbegovic and Ejup Ganic, who are once again voicing conditions, even ultimatums.

Local elections in Mostar, town in Herzegovina divided between Muslims and Croats, were to be a test for general elections, but they will not be held on May 31 as scheduled but perhaps in June.

The test is therefore not very encouraging and it remains to be seen whether some new agreement to be reached perhaps in Geneva would help resolve the problem.

Albania: Leading Election Contenders Affirm Priority of U.S. Ties*AU2405073596 Paris AFP in English
2324 GMT 23 May 96**[By Briseida Mema]*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 24 (AFP)—The former communists and the Democrats who are rivals in Sunday's parliamentary elections have one thing in common: a solidly pro-U.S. foreign policy.

The United States was Enemy No. 1 during the bloody, isolationist postwar dictatorship of President Enver Hoxha, who squandered scarce resources to build 720,000 bunkers that still deface Albania's majestic mountains and otherwise pristine coastline.

Today, even though western Europe is the principal source of foreign aid, good relations with the United States is "a priority of Albanian foreign policy," Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, underscored in an interview with AFP.

While spending only 160 million dollars since President Sali Berisha inaugurated Albania's post-communist era four years ago, Washington has forged extremely close ties with Tirana, particularly in the defense area.

Albania was one of the first former communist countries to join NATO's Partnership for Peace program in 1994.

Defense Secretary William Perry has been here twice. There have been 11 joint military exercises, and the Albanian Defense Minister, Safet Zhulali, has on his staff five US officers on loan from Washington to help him modernize Albania's army—with equipment provided by the United States.

"We want to be the favourites of the Americans in the Balkans," Zhulali told AFP.

In return, the United States has intervened to defuse tensions with Greece and has backed Tirana's efforts to help ethnic Albanians in the ex-Yugoslav province of Kosovo, part of Serbia, win a measure of autonomy.

Berisha's main challenger, Gramoz Ruci, was interior minister in the last communist government. He is the leader of the Socialist Party, successor to the communist party.

Yet even Ruci has made it clear that in case of victory, his party would stay the pro-U.S. course set by his predecessor, just as he has vowed to continue the privatisation process started by Berisha.

Berisha has said on numerous occasions that Albania was ready to put its military facilities at the disposal of U.S. forces. During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

the U.S. military used an Albanian airfield to launch pilotless spy planes over the former Yugoslavia.

Preliminary talks on turning over to the Pentagon a military base on the island of Sazan, in the Strait of Otranto, have taken place, and Ruci says he supports the idea.

Pro-U.S. feelings are not new in Albania. When the communist regime was crumbling in the early 1990s and hundreds of thousands of Albanians crowded the ports in a desperate effort to emigrate, their goal was not France or Italy or Greece: it was America.

Such unbridled admiration tends to irritate west European diplomats here, who point to EU aid figures—400 million dollars in four years, nearly three times the U.S. aid—and complain privately that they are often ignored in the elaboration of Albanian foreign policy.

Albania: Party Leaders Hold Election Rallies in Districts*AU2405074796*

[FBIS Report] Tirana ATA in English at 1027, 1149, and 1256 GMT on 23 May carries several reports on rallies held by party leaders on the eve of the 26 May parliamentary elections.

A 1027 GMT report by A. Sakja says that Democratic Party (PD) Chairman Tritan Shehu held a rally in Qafmolle village. ATA cites Shehu as saying: "The Democratic Party, besides concrete funds and real possibilities, also plans in its program for a faster development of the countryside." He further stated that: "With the investments in infrastructure and with the lines of credit for concrete projects, we shall reach 2000 with a level acceptable for Europe." Shehu "presented the PD candidates Bedri Collaku and Bamir Topi for the villages of Tirana and Elbasan." At a rally in Labinot-Fushe in Elbasan, and "in the presence of thousands of inhabitants," Shehu said that "the PD enjoys the full support of the world, it has greater possibilities to guarantee the development of the country and its integration into Europe."

A 1149 GMT report says that "Socialist Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi met with inhabitants of the Erseke, Bilsht, Korce, and Pogradec cities and presented the candidates and electoral programme of the Socialist Party (PS)." According to the report, "Pellumbi repeated the simple messages for free elections and the peaceful handing over of power."

"With the Socialist Party we will build genuine democracy"—This was the synthesis of the messages and slogans of Pellumbi's meetings."

Pellumbi also met with inhabitants in Pogradec, stressing: "The Socialist Party offers chances for building a genuine democratic society. It has drafted a realistic programme with not only the intention to win a victory in the May 26 elections but also of governing the country over the next four years."

A 1256 GMT report notes that Social Democratic Party (PSD) Chairman Skender Gjinushi met with residents of Has District. ATA cites Gjinushi as saying: "The state should follow a social policy in defence of various strata of the population in this transition period." In his meeting with Fushe-Arrez voters, Gjinushi "dealt with the objectives and perspectives opened by the PSD programme regarding the development of different sectors in the city and countryside." In Puke, Gjinushi said that "the PSD consolidation is indispensable to balance the coming Albanian Parliament."

ATA also reports that "the Republican leader Sabri Godo had meetings with the electorate of the 38th Constituency yesterday (22 May) in Durres, where he is a candidate for deputy" and stated that "the fight against corruption is in the program of the Republican Party."

It further reported that, on 20 May, the Human Rights Union (PBDNJ) branch in Gjirokaster "held a rally" in which PBDNJ Chairman Vasil Melo "spoke about a party coalition to run the country in the coming four years" and stressed that "the PBDNJ should take a dignified place in this coalition."

Democratic Alliance (AD) leaders held a rally in Tirana on 22 May and said that "they would cooperate without distinction with all political forces in Albania, except the PD."

On May 21, National Unity Party Deputy Chairmen Bedri Dedja and Ilir Mborja "held a meeting with the electorate of Ballsh city, calling on electors to vote for the candidate for deputy of their party."

ATA reports that Legality Movement Party branch in Durres "presented two candidates for deputy in the coming parliament, Lluke Prifti and Osman Audedja." Kadri Dajko, the party branch chairman for Durres, "explained the program of the Movement of Legality Party."

Thoma Mico, PBDNJ candidate in Sarande, "had meetings recently with the electorate of his zone, which included 67 villages of the districts of Sarande and Delvine."

Albania: PS Rally Disrupted, Deputy Chairman Assaulted

AU2305203796 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian
23 May 96 p 3

[Article by Emin Barci: "Attempt To Murder Servet Pellumbi"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A screwdriver was aimed at the body of Socialist Party (PS) Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi in front of 4,000 people in the total darkness of the Durres Sports Palace yesterday. Only the arm of Genc Narellari, his bodyguard, saved the Socialist leader's life. Blood from a 3-cm-deep, 1-cm-wide wound reddened the floor of the Sports Palace. However, this was only the end of the saga of the Socialist leaders in Durres. The PS had planned its rally in the Durres Sports Palace for 1800 yesterday. However, sources within the Durres police had reported that barricades had again been raised at the crossroads in Shijak to prevent the Socialists' entering Durres. Their cars therefore set off from Tirana by another route via Ndroq and the beach. About 100 people in private cars, under the eyes of the police, had blocked the entry to the city at the bridge of Dajlan, 1 km before Durres. According to the Socialist leaders, most of the people on the barricades were former common criminals, and the police did nothing to clear the road. Certain people tried to approach Mr. Pellumbi in order to strike at him. It was Pellumbi's guards who saved his car from harm. Under these circumstances, Pellumbi was obliged to enter Durres through the port and via the back streets. About 30 minutes later, the PS leaders managed to reach the packed Sports Palace. However, the hall's sound system was not operating. Somebody had stolen the microphones and broken the loudspeakers. The Socialists were obliged to explain their policies in loud voices to 4,000 enthusiastic people. However, only five minutes after the start of the rally and when Socialist enthusiasm was at its height, the lights went out and the hall was plunged in darkness. For about half an hour, the Socialists tried to lighten the darkness with their enthusiastic shouts of "The PS will win! We want Fatos Nano!" Exploiting the darkness, some of those who had blocked the road at the entry to the city entered the hall and tried to murder Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi with a screwdriver. However, the screwdriver ended up in the arm of his bodyguard, Genc Narellari. We learned from the PS Information Office yesterday evening that the person who committed this act of terrorism has been identified and will be reported to the procurator today for criminal prosecution.

Albania: Judge Rules 'Detention in Prison' for Communist Leaders

AU2305183396 Tirana ATA in English
1916 GMT 22 May 96

[Report by Atlant Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 22 (ATA)—The jury headed by judge Seit Hoxha in today's session let in power Tirana's Court detention in prison during inquiry as asked by the Tirana Prosecutor's Office against Timoshenko Pekmezi and Kristaq Mosko, accused of creating the New Communist Party.

The jury announced this decision after yesterday's request of defendants to substitute the above security measure with another easier one because, according to them, they were not so dangerous for such a measure of security.

The Prosecutor's Office had asked detention in prison for the defendants who are charged of creating the New Communist Party and have accepted it.

According to Main Constitutional Dispositions in the Republic of Albania it is anti-constitutional and outlaw the creation of communist and other similar parties.

This is foreseen as a penal act from the Albanian Penal Code in Article 224/2 and may be sentenced with imprisonment from 1-5 years.

Albanian Parliament has also declared outlaw the Communist Party created by Hysni Millosi in 1992.

Albania: Court Sentences 3 Ex-Communist Leaders to Death

AU2405112396 Paris AFP in English
1051 GMT 24 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 24 (AFP)—A court here Friday sentenced to death three former communist leaders for genocide and crimes against humanity.

The three are former deputy interior minister Duluftar Ramizi, Aranit Cela, former head of the Supreme Court, and Rrapi Mino, the former prosecutor general.

Two others, former deputy prime minister and head of the deportation commission Manush Myftiu, and the former speaker of parliament Hazhi Lleshi, were sentenced to life in prison.

The court found the five defendants guilty of the massive deportation of Albanians who were ousted for their political, ideological and religious beliefs in violation of the constitution and international law.

Czech Republic: Slovenia's Kucan Arrives on Official Visit

AU2305155496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 23 May 96

[Report on the official visit by Slovene President Milan Kucan to the Czech Republic by Tomaz Gerden in Prague on 23 May—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The two state delegations, headed by the two presidents, started talks immediately. Vaclav Havel and Milan Kucan spoke about the contents of their talks at a news conference:

The Czech president gave assurances that the bilateral relations between the Czech Republic and Slovenia are very good. The two countries share their goals and interest in integration into Europe. Havel described the exhibition on the work of Jozef Plecnik as a unique rehabilitation of this famous Slovene architect who reshaped the face of Prague and especially Hradcany.

President Kucan thanked the Czech Republic for allowing this Slovene presentation, which Slovene and Czech experts have been preparing for three years. The statesmen repeated their views on Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral state.

President Kucan emphasized that the two problems burdening Slovene-Czech relations will soon be resolved. Namely, this entails the repayment of the Slovene clearing account debt and the sale of the Krsko paper factory.

Kucan explained to the Czech journalists the problems encountered by Slovenia in joining the European Union. The Czech Republic is already an associate EU member and has similar legislation pertaining to the sale of real estate to foreigners as Slovenia. Havel believes that the country will have to harmonize this with the European standards.

Both presidents were of the opinion that the countries should maintain good economic cooperation within CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association].

This evening, Kucan and Havel will ceremonially open the Plecnik exhibition. Various meetings of Foreign Minister Thaler, Culture Minister Dular, and Ljubljana Mayor Rupel and their Czech hosts are scheduled for this afternoon.

Czech Republic: IFOR Mission To Cost More Than Expected

AU2305165296 Prague PRAVO in Czech 23 May 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Czech IFOR Military Mission Will Cost More Than Planned"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Czech military mission within the framework of the IFOR [Implementation Force] multinational forces in the former Yugoslavia will, by all accounts, cost much more than had originally been assumed.

It is already apparent that the original costs amounting to 1.2 billion korunas [Kc] will be exceeded by roughly Kc80-90 million.

Defense Minister Vilem Holan (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party) informs the government of this in a written report on the deployment of the Czech Army unit. His department is now preparing an analysis of and the sources for the additional finances. It is also apparent from the report that the incorporation of the Czech battalion—and thus also of its jurisdiction—within the Canadian brigade does not satisfy the objectives of our Army's representatives. According to them, "certain restrictive conditions, including a lack of interest in our involvement," are being manifested.

According to the minister, the expansion of the Czech battalion's operational tasks is responsible for the unexpected increase in its costs. The budget has also been spoiled by the fact that, at variance with the wording of the Dayton agreements, according to which the lease of the facilities and areas in the territory of the units' deployment was supposed to have been free of charge, the local administrative bodies are demanding fees amounting to up to \$7,000 per month for each facility.

Czech Republic: Political Aspect of Fighter Purchase Viewed

AU2305192296 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 23 May 96 p 2

[Analysis] by Jan Gazdik: "The Purchase of Western Fighters Is Obviously Inevitable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The increasing interest of the U.S., Swedish, and French Governments in selling fighters to the Czech Republic is associated with extraordinarily sensitive political, economic, and ecological questions. Answering them will be a task for the cabinet that emerges from the coming parliamentary elections.

Politicians, diplomats, and Army experts also think that citizens are not ready for the intensive operation of military aircraft that is, on the other hand, common in alliance countries.

Therefore, the experts think it is logical that the current governing coalition has not had the urge in an election year to confront taxpayers with the purchase of military aircraft for several tens of billions of korunas. At the same time, the Cabinet would have to say that a reequipped Air Force will increase sharply the number of hours that pilots have to fly per annum and thus also the costs of operating this type of force.

The government put off the decision on astronomical investments for the Army this year because, according to a poll conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research, a mere 30 percent of the population trusts the armed forces. This is 9 percent fewer than at the beginning of 1990.

Likewise, for the first time in three years, there are now more opponents than supporters of the country's admission to the North Atlantic alliance, to which the purchase of Western fighters is related. Forty-six percent of the population supports NATO membership; 8 percent more are opposed to it. Furthermore, if entry into NATO were to mean the deployment of nuclear weapons on the Republic's territory, only 18 percent of citizens would agree to it.

Moreover, the purchase of Western aircraft means a four to five times greater noise factor, against which citizens are already protesting. That is, General Staff officers are forecasting that, as in NATO countries, the aircraft would be literally in the air day and night. "Western aircraft are designed for 200 flying hours per annum. Therefore, it is impossible to fly with them much less often than with the Russian aircraft," said a senior General Staff officer.

Diplomats and military experts think that the purchase of Western aircraft will be one of the first strategic decisions of the new government. Namely, according to them, the security of the country, which the aging Russian aircraft are beginning to put at risk, is at stake. The director of the Foreign Ministry's department for security policy, Hynek Fajmon, has, moreover, confirmed that a major package of socioeconomic issues

that will affect to a varying extent a large number of citizens employed in engineering is associated with the Western-manufactured military aircraft. That is, all of the repairs to these aircraft would be carried out by domestic firms.

Czech Republic: Poll Suggests More Voters Undecided

AU2305191796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 23 May 96 p 1

[Report by "(jik)": "The Number of People Who Do Not Yet Know For Whom To Vote Has Increased"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—At the start of the election campaign, when increasingly more voters should be clear about whom to vote for, the number of those who are still hesitating has, on the contrary, gone up.

According to a survey conducted by the Factum agency for MLADA FRONTA DNES at the end of last week and the beginning of this week among 500 people, 12 percent of the respondents state that they are undecided, while, a month before the elections, there were only 7 percent of them.

"It is not out of the question that some voters only became aware of the existence of certain parties at the start of the election campaign and are now thinking about transferring to them," said Jan Herzmann, the director of the Factum agency, yesterday. He thinks that the voters of the four parties that did not pay the election deposit and thus cannot take part in the elections have now ranked themselves among the undecided.

Preference for the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], which enjoys the greatest support among citizens, is the same after the start of the campaign as it was a month before the elections. According to the survey, 24 percent of the respondents support this party.

Indeed, the gap between first, the ODS, and second, the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD], has widened. At the beginning of May, the gap between these two parties had narrowed to 4 percent in the Factum agency's survey; now, 6 percent separates them again. That is, 18 percent of the respondents support the CSSD, while there were 2 percent more of them at the beginning of May. "There is a decline, but statistical error cannot be ruled out," pointed out Herzmann.

The results of a poll on the popularity of the Prague election leaders also suggests that the gap between the ODS and the CSSD could really have increased again at the start of the campaign. In a so-called compulsory selection among the leaders of the five major

parties, 32 percent chose the ODS's election leader, Josef Zieleniec (25 percent a month ago), and 18 percent chose the CSSD's election leader, Petra Buzkova (21 percent last time).

The Factum agency's recent survey has indicated that the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's

Party has a chance of winning 10 percent of the vote in the elections and that the Civic Democratic Alliance, the communists, and Sladek's republicans may get 7 percent each. The other parties ended up with less than 5 percent, and, according to the survey, have virtually no chance of winning seats in parliament.

Slovakia: Interior Minister Survives No-Confidence Vote

*LD2305161596 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1300 GMT 23 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] In a secret ballot today, the National Council did not pass a vote of no-confidence on Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek. According to records, the deputies submitted 73 valid ballots. Sixty deputies voted against no-confidence and 13 voted in favor.

Deputy Speaker Augustin Marian Huska said parliament had not approved the vote of no-confidence on Minister Hudek. The vote was called by a group of deputies from the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement], the DU [Democratic Union], and the Hungarian Coalition.

Slovakia: Kovac Urges Removal of Interior Minister, SIS Head

*LD2305192696 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 23 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Slovak presidential office on 23 May issued a statement from the president on the report on the Slovak Intelligence Service [SIS] that was delivered in parliament on 22 May by SIS director Ivan Lexa. The statement says that the report proved that the SIS had gone markedly beyond the activities allowed by the law and was engaged in illegal activities. The statement continues:

No clause in the law gives the SIS the right to follow and judge the activities of the Slovak president, political parties, churches, and journalists. However, the report is primarily devoted to these areas.

President Michal Kovac's statement says that the Slovak Republic is not being threatened by the above-mentioned entities. It is in fact Ivan Lexa, his office and those behind him who are polarizing, radicalizing, and fragmenting society with the primary aim of being able to manipulate it according to their wishes. [passage omitted]

Michal Kovac's statement on the SIS report continues: As the Technopol case [in which president's son is accused of fraud] and the attempts to portray Michal Kovac Jr. as a criminal have failed to reach their goal—that is, the removal of the president—the plotters involved in this case decided to carry out a violent kidnapping of the president's son, taking him abroad. The president has reached this conclusion on the basis of hard evidence—testimonies, documents, and material evidence. The president himself would welcome it if the SIS managed to refute this serious suspicion, but he has to say that neither the SIS director's report nor the third investigator of the [Kovac] case have managed to do so.

Michal Kovac's statement goes on to say: The entire tone of the SIS report shows that it was not aimed at briefing [deputies] about the SIS's fulfillment of the tasks outlined by the law but at attacking the democratic forces in the country. This is destabilizing our society; this is threatening Slovakia's international standing.

President Michal Kovac concludes his statement on the SIS report by highlighting the fact that Slovakia's current situation urgently calls for changes not only in the post of SIS director but also in the post of prosecutor-general and that of interior minister. Such changes would significantly contribute not only to gradually improving Slovakia's standing in the world but also to reviving our citizens' trust in the Prosecutor's Office, the police bodies, and the secret service, as well as to reducing the unwanted increase in extremism in society and to gradually improving the general climate in society.

Slovakia: Carnogursky, Slobodnik Differ on Foreign Policy

*96CH0083D Bratislava THE SLOVAK SPECTATOR
in English 13-26 Mar 96 p 4*

[Abridged text of a debate translated by Paul Kaye: "Spectrum Live: Leaders Debate Slovakia's Foreign Policy"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On March 1, *THE SLOVAK SPECTATOR's* first anniversary of publishing, Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the Slovak parliamentary foreign committee, and Jan Carnogursky, the chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, accepted the newspaper's invitation to debate Slovakia's foreign policy in front of a live audience at Bratislava's Divadlo West theater. The event, called Spectrum Live, was the first in the Debates for Democracy series. The BBC's Slovakia correspondent, Zuzana Martinakova, moderated the event as a panel of four journalists fired away with questions. The panel consisted of Anna Samelova from Radio Twist, Dusan D. Kerny from Slovak Television, Lubomir Hudo from SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA and Ivan Horsky from NARODNA OBRODA. The debate followed the format used for presidential campaign debates in the USA. A journalist poses a question to one of the participants, who has two minutes to answer. His adversary then has the same amount of time to respond, and finally the first speaker has a minute to react to the latter's comments. At the end of the evening, questions were accepted from the audience. Excerpts from the debate are published below.

Samelova: What do you expect from the parliamentary resolution interpreting the Slovak-Hungarian basic

treaty? This kind of document can only be binding for the Slovak side.

Slobodnik: International practice in these kinds of agreements allows additions to be made to protocols, which are only valid for the side that makes them. We all know this from the German-Czechoslovak treaty, and we know this from previous Hungarian-Slovak experience when, on April 19, 1995, the Gabcikovo treaty was signed, and the Hungarian side immediately produced its interpretation of the treaty. The resolution will be binding for the Slovak government. Parliament, if it approves it, will decide how far the Slovak side can put the treaty into practice.

Carnogursky: The thing that is noteworthy about the Slovak-Hungarian treaty is that although it was signed by Prime Minister (Vladimir) Meciar, who is the chairman of the HZDS, in parliamentary debate on the treaty, which started during the November session, speakers from the coalition camp came out against its ratification, with only one exception, I think.

Kerny: *Will there be a risk of destabilization in central Europe after ratification of the treaty?*

Slobodnik: I am convinced that this danger doesn't exist. I repeat what I have already said—Slovakia, its government and most of its parliament would not ratify this treaty if it weren't 100 percent sure that there are no articles that could threaten Slovakia's interests. In the Council of Europe's ministerial board, there is an absolute refusal of collective rights. Everything that minorities need is included in the framework agreement. Up to now this has been signed by around 30 countries. Unfortunately, only 4 have ratified it—Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Spain. Twelve signatures are necessary for it to become binding.

Carnogursky: The ratification of the treaty or the contents of the treaty—including recommendation number 1201—does not represent any legal tool that could be used, by the Hungarian political parties for instance, to gain territorial autonomy. The real problem here is a different one. The ratification of this treaty and especially provision 1201, not the one about possible autonomy, but different ones that establish the free possibility for members of an ethnic minority and of the majority nation to choose the ethnic and cultural orientation. This recommendation will make it possible for citizens of Slovak or Hungarian nationality in southern Slovakia to assert themselves, based on how proud they are of their nation, their homeland, their state. On this point I am very critical of the current governing coalition, whose policies no Slovak can be proud of. And in implementing these policies it weakens these people's chances for developing their own national awareness.

The ratification of this treaty should not just be a single act, but should serve as the starting point for a fundamental change in the governing coalition's policies.

Horsky: *Carnogursky is known for his affinity towards Russia and he can be considered the originator of the southern axis concept. Which concept do you prefer now? Or do you have other priorities?*

Carnogursky: When I have shown, as you put it, affinity towards Russia, then I have shown it in this respect—I acknowledge the importance of Russia, its historical importance; it was basically Russia that defeated fascism, Russia overthrew Communism and enabled other states to get rid of it. We can't ignore Russia from these historical and cultural aspects, from the geopolitical aspect and from the economic aspect. Even though our basic orientation is towards western European structures, we can't ignore Russia or implement policies that would be provocative towards her. As far as the southern axis goes, yes, we see in our history, in the last century, the Croats and Serbs were more important allies for us than, for example, the Czechs. Our relations with the Croats and Serbs were stronger than those with the Czechs. And just as this is true geographically, then it's true economically, and so I think that we should complement our basic western orientation with our affinity to Russia and the southern states.

Slobodnik: As a Russian scholar, I too profess an affinity towards Russia, its culture and its economic significance for Slovakia. What I don't like about this whole thing, and this does not concern Mr. Carnogursky so much as journalists, is that Russia is purposefully being made out as some kind of model for Slovakia. The impression is being created that Slovakia does not want to lean towards those western European structures that Mr. Carnogursky mentioned, but that it is inclining towards Russia. We lean towards Russia economically. We are dependent on Russia for raw materials, for economic cooperation, but we are not dependent and we are not implementing any political affinity in the bad sense of the word, and of course, we have no military affinity with Russia. Our orientation, in economic and defence matters, is towards the West.

Carnogursky: Slovakia belongs historically, economically and theologically to Western civilization, and that's why I claim that Slovakia can afford to put out friendly signals towards Russia; we can do this precisely because of the fact that our affiliation to Western civilization is beyond question.

Kerny: *According to the BBC, Slovakia is one of the most isolated countries. What's the situation then—are we isolated or not?*

Slobodnik: Slovakia is not isolated. The fact that we do not have a stable position in the foreign media is perhaps partly our fault, but it is also the fault of those who would devalue our chosen path, those who use every opportunity to send out some signal or other. I could cite things from THE NEW YORK TIMES which are really undignified. We must do more so that they know more about us. It costs an awful lot of money.

Carnogursky: It's useless for the coalition to invest loads of money, as you have said, to improve Slovakia's name abroad, let's say by putting advertisements in THE NEW YORK TIMES, when in the same issue a short news item appears saying that a Slovak citizen has been abducted and taken abroad, and the police, who wanted to investigate the case, have been withdrawn, or they have stopped the investigation. Then that very expensive page in THE NEW YORK TIMES is completely useless.

Slobodnik: How can you, a lawyer, be so certain that the Michal Kovac Jr. case is so black and white? I can give you dozens of reasons that are at the very least suspicious. Why did it happen on the exact same day that the state prosecution announced that it would not allow him to be cross-examined at the German embassy? Why was it claimed that he drank a liter and a half of whiskey? He would have died. Why did they take him only to Austria? If (SIS Director Ivan) Lexa did it, then he would have taken him (laughter from the audience) ... well, I don't mean Lexa personally, don't take it like that. If it was Lexa and I were him, then I would have taken him straight to Germany, the car wouldn't have come back home, and I would have handed him over to Interpol. The car wouldn't have come back home like it did from Austria, where it was in the president's hands for 24 hours. All traces could have been destroyed by his people. Why haven't the two people who were on those phantom portraits been found? We live in a democratic country and you cannot deny that this case will be solved, not in 10 years, as you'd like to say—but you won't because you're wrong—it will be solved sooner, and I assure you that the result will not be what you expect.

Hudo: Carnogursky, aren't you afraid of the possibility of the gloomy picture of Slovakia, which the opposition helps to create, coming back to hit you in the face like a boomerang if you find yourself in government?

Carnogursky: Slovakia is seen negatively abroad partly because the son of the Slovak president was abducted and the case still has not been solved. It is seen in a negative light because of the governing coalition's moves against the media, against other political parties, because of the way it ignores elections, when it cast doubt

on the parliamentary mandate of the Democratic Union, and for other reasons. And so when the government actually tries to hide this by comforting itself and lying to itself by passing all the blame onto the shoulders of the opposition, then it disables or makes life difficult for itself when the time comes for truth to be found. It reminds me of the time under Communism when the Communists blamed all its failures on the "diversion" of the imperialists.

Slobodnik: I have to reject these negative claims about the relationship with the media and the relationship with the Democratic Union—it's absolutely ridiculous; the freedom of the press that we have in Slovakia doesn't exist in any other country. I can give you statistical data. (laughter from the audience) I see that you are amused, well, that's nice of you. I can assure you, the opposition has at least as much time as the coalition in the electronic media, and that's not to mention the 19 daily newspapers that are against the three basic ones. But the government politicians have one advantage, and that is that they take part in talks and negotiations. And here we have one specific case of what Mr. Hudo mentioned. The chairman of parliament, Ivan Gasparovic, and I took part in talks with the associated countries of the European Union in Warsaw at the end of last year. There it was clearly stated that any talks on EU entry would be postponed until the end of the intergovernmental conference, which is starting now in Turin and which will finish half way through 1997. Talks will be held for a year on the entry of Malta and Cyprus, and then all the other countries will be next in line, all on the same starting line. But your party's expert on the foreign affairs committee said that EU countries have misgivings about Slovakia. This behavior casts doubt on Slovakia itself, on the same Slovakia which you would like to get your hands on in 1998, not by picking up power off the street, but by legal means. Well, I can tell you now, that won't happen. That won't happen.

Carnogursky: I agree with you, Mr. Slobodnik, that the time frame is such that the intergovernmental conference must finish first. It's true that sometime in 1998 the debate about Slovakia's joining the European Union will be on the agenda. But Slovakia's chances of joining the European Union will increase significantly, and then we really will be seen as in the same basket as the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians, if the perpetrators of the Michal Kovac Jr. kidnapping are uncovered by that time.

Question from the audience: Mr. Slobodnik, what is your prediction of future political development in Russia, and which Russia is Prime Minister Meciar holding

talks with? Is is the Russia of Yeltsin, Zyuganov or Zhirinovskiy?

Slobodnik: If I knew how the elections will turn out, I assure you I would be a multi-millionaire, because I would collect money from all the world's media for telling them what I know. Zhirinovskiy is not a danger, and I'm not sure it will be Yeltsin. I worry more about the Communist, Zyuganov. But of course, it's still an open question. As far as I know, Mr. Meciar is talking with the government and its bodies, with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and soon. So please, don't try to lump Prime Minister Meciar in with Zhirinovskiy, don't try to lump him in with any of the others.

Carnogursky: I would just like to say this much. Mr. Slobodnik, you have just replied to that question half-jokingly—please, that's your prerogative, but the question wasn't even half-jokingly raised, and in essence is not a joke at all, because there are certain forces in Russia which aren't—at least not all of them are—pleasant towards us. We have to ask ourselves the question, who do we want to cooperate with in Russia, and I don't just mean after the results of the elections but strategically too. So if we want good relations with Russia, then we have to say which Russia it is that we want these relations with.

Question from the audience: *What will the Christian Democratic Movement's first step be if it wins the next elections?*

Carnogursky: One of the first things that we will do, within 48 hours, is to replace one of the investigators who were looking into the Kovac Jr. kidnapping—either Major Simunic or Major Vacok.

Slobodnik: Although I wrote a book called "the genesis and poetics of science fiction," around 15 years ago, I don't want to bring science fiction into politics. I mean that this will not happen. Mr. Simunic knowingly did as much as possible to get taken off the case. They couldn't have not withdrawn him from the investigation, after so many mistakes. And it's the same with Mr. Vacok, but in a different way. Mr. Vacok said that the prime minister was influencing him. When the prime minister asked him what it was all about, he said, "I read it somewhere" and retracted it all. So these kinds of investigators in the end will not be necessary. It will be solved before then and the real culprits and those who have up to now been hiding in the shadows and who have been trying to blame it all on Meciar, on the government, not personally on Meciar, only you have been trying that one, when you started with that thing about the foreign trip, and you haven't mentioned it since because you saw that you had thrown a bomb which exploded, then the foreign journalists latched onto

it; "where were you, Mr. Meciar, on the night of August 31?" You haven't mentioned it since. Not once. Because the bomb had been thrown, it had served its purpose. Well, let's just wait, you're a lawyer, does the principle of innocent until proven guilty not apply here? Yes, it does.

Carnogursky: My question will last until Mr. Meciar replies to it negatively or affirmatively. But I will continue a little with what I was saying. I said that within 48 hours we would return one or the other investigators to his position, and I continue, I am convinced that within two weeks the perpetrators would be uncovered. But if this did happen earlier, then I would lose a bottle of cognac, because I have offered to send Mr. Meciar a bottle if the perpetrators are found during the current government's period of office. And I would gladly do this.

Question from the audience: *Slovakia's economic success is often mentioned these days in terms of macroeconomic indicators. Aren't these successes of ours too short-term, and to the detriment of our children?*

Carnogursky: Yes, that's what it leads to. It leads to the fact that in five, 10 or 15 years, Slovakia won't have any macroeconomic growth, or it will all be on paper. And if SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA is still being published then, it will still be writing about them.

Slobodnik: The macroeconomic results will be transmitted into the microeconomy, this means that they will be seen in the social sphere, it's just a question of time. We can't start with successes in the social sphere, as some would have it, in fact we would all like it to be like that, if we're being honest. But it really is necessary to start with the macroeconomic aspect. And then, I'm convinced, next year won't be a year of saving, as you have called it, but a year of economy. I know, but you mentioned it. But it will be a year when the improvement will be seen more markedly than up to now, in the microeconomy of the social sphere.

Carnogursky: I believe in the vitality of Slovakia, despite the fact that only 2 percent of available resources have been invested into development. I believe that Slovakia will find, even in these more modest circumstances, the ability to successfully compete with other countries. Yes, it will mean more moderation, it will mean having to work in more difficult conditions, but I believe that we'll make it. Together we'll make it.

Slovakia: Ratification of Hungarian Treaty Seen as Beginning*AU2205204896 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 16 May 96 p 1*

[Commentary by Monika Volekova in the "Public Matter" column]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungary certainly sighed with relief during yesterday's exchange of ratification documents of the compromise Slovak-Hungarian bilateral treaty. I expect that the sigh was only due to exhaustion. Hungary is well aware that it is basically beginning all over again, only at a different level. It is not enough to sign and ratify a treaty. Minority rights—which have been the focus of discord—must be observed. It is generally known that the standard of ethnic minority rights is very high here, and numerous delegations from West Europe have verified the fact. The Slovaks in Hungary live, however, under different conditions. Although they were able to form their self-administrative bodies according to a magnanimous ethnic law (what are their actual rights?), even the state does not have sufficient funds to support them, and that speaks for itself. The Slovak-Hungarian treaty is not a piece of paper with something written on it: The implementation of the rights of ethnic minorities must be in accordance with the state internal regime, and loyalty to the state is emphasized. The common border is unchangeable and inviolable, and making any territorial claims is ruled out.

We proved two things by the ratification: We belong to the European family of democratic nations and are capable of rising above the bitter past. It is impossible, however, to rise above the criminalization of Slovakia abroad. Christopher Smith, chairman of the U.S. Congress Helsinki Commission, stated recently in connection with the explosion in front of the house of Bela Bugar, deputy of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, and the explosion of the car of Robert Remias: "Although it is not yet certain who is responsible for these deeds, it is obvious that violence coincides with politics in Slovakia to a great degree." That is how Smith assesses the political situation in Slovakia without any evidence regarding the real culprits. It has its logic. The presumption of innocence applies to people but not to politics.

Slovakia: Wording of Penal Code Amendment Questioned*96CH0092A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 26 Mar 96 p 4*

[Article by Emma McClune: "Meciar Moves To Outlaw Criticism"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Slovak human-rights worker Miroslav Kusy, 65, says he doesn't want to go back to jail.

In 1989, Kusy was sentenced to nine months in prison for feeding underground reports via telephone to Radio Free Europe. He was charged under a paragraph of the 1948 communist law that prohibited citizens from "harming the good name of the state abroad."

Now, that law is back.

The Slovak cabinet has approved an amendment to the penal code that, if passed by Parliament, will enable the state to jail critics of the government.

Parliament is scheduled to read the amendment at this month's session. Few doubt that Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), with a parliamentary majority, will make the amendment law.

If passed in Parliament, "subversion of the republic or the spread of untrue information about Slovakia" by individuals will be punishable by six months to three years in jail. Members of a body or organization found guilty under the amendment would face a sentence of up to five years.

Kusy, chairman of the Milan Simecka Foundation, a human-rights group, said the proposal is a replica of Czechoslovakia's "protection of the republic" law, which led to thousands of people being persecuted during the communist era.

"Some paragraphs in this new proposal (follow the old law) word for word. The similarity is very clear," he said from Bratislava. "If this proposal is accepted, and I fear that it will be, it means that we are going back to totalitarianism."

Daniel Butora, editor of the Slovak service at Radio Free Europe, said Meciar's proposal is vaguely worded and open to interpretation. Certainly, if passed, the law could

be "very dangerous" for journalists, "but we should wait and see how they are going to implement it," he said, adding that similar legislation exists in Romania, but is not implemented widely.

Others have no doubt that Meciar intends to return to suppressive measures.

At an HZDS political rally, held just hours before the cabinet meeting, Meciar boasted of squeezing out critics.

"We shall not tolerate subversion of the republic," he said, repeating a slogan coined by Klement Gottwald, first communist president of Czechoslovakia. "Tonight, we shall pass an amendment to the penal code, and we shall finally outlaw these things."

Frantisek Miklosko, from the opposition Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), sees the amendment and Meciar's adopted slogan as "yet another sign" that the country is due for another bout of 1950s-style rule.

Furthermore, the proposal is illegal, said former Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik, a lawyer who chairs the opposition Democratic Union of Slovakia.

"It's unconstitutional; it's aimed at limiting freedom of speech, and it's completely against political competition. It's a giant step toward totalitarianism," Moravcik said.

During the same week of the amendment's approval, the Slovak government received yet another highly critical report from Western human-rights watchdogs. The U.S. Department of State criticized the Slovak government for violating human rights as well as controlling the media.

But Meciar is not likely to listen to Western criticism at this juncture, said Sharon Fisher, Slovak research analyst at the Open Media Research Institute (OMRI).

"The government just says that the West is reacting to false information spread by bad journalists," she said. "Even though the West has already complained a lot, this doesn't have much effect on policy."

Slovakia: Implications of New Language Law Questioned

96CH0086A Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Slovak
29 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Brano Hochel: "The Calm Before the Storm"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following hectic debates prior to and during its approval process, National Council of the Slovak Republic Law No. 270/95 on the state language of the Slovak Republic became effective 1

January 1996 (with the exception of the sanctions segment). Even prior to its adoption, I expressed the opinion that its application will not so much involve how we shall write, but rather what we shall be writing about. The approved version of the law has proved me right.

Apart from the statements by the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] and the Hungarian coalition regarding the unconstitutionality of some of the provisions of the law and regarding the intention of placing the initiative of the delegates before the Constitutional Court, there is "linguistic" peace. A little bit of disturbance is being created only by Milan Ferko, "director general of the Slovak language." This is the official who obviously is responsible for introducing the law into practice and whose "initiatives" and "ideas" entertain the specialized legal and linguistic public.

The Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic, choosing 1 January as the effective date, declared that the "basis for the codified image of the state language" would be the Rules of Slovak Orthography (1991), the Brief Dictionary of the Slovak Language (1987, 1989), and the Rules of Slovak Pronunciation (1984, by A. Kral). It is a certain paradox that the Brief Dictionary of the Slovak Language is not designed to be a codifying work at all. Apart from that factor, however, it is possible to state unequivocally that despite the fact that the decree issued by the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic refers to Section 2 of the law, it is evidently in conflict with that section. The decree is thus legally irrelevant, misleading, and, thus, eo ipso, invalid from the very beginning. In other words: It is of completely equal validity in Slovakia as the recently published Anglican missionary handbook dealing with the conjugation of verbs in the Bolivian tribal language of quechua.

The Ministry of Culture has created new jobs—for the present, for four so-called language inspectors; taxpayers are glad to pay them, or rather to supplement their pensions, because three of the inspectors are retirees. These inspectors, who are employees of the Ministry of Culture, must "have access to all documents and all negotiations that it (understand the Ministry of Culture) considers to be suitable," said Milan Ferko. This is a very arbitrary (even though anticipated) explanation. The language law made no mention of any access to anything or any location. And ministerial officials have no access to any location that someone "considers to be suitable," but only where the law permits them to have access or possibly where those who are interested will voluntarily grant them access.

Another noteworthy bit of arbitrariness is the oft-repeated contention by M. Ferko that, according to the

law, the manufacturers and sellers of software products must make sure that the Slovak version of the programs and the Slovak alphabet are used. The law stipulates no such thing. Work involving computers is, for the most part, private; frequently, it is an intimate matter, and the law avoids this sphere. According to the law, the only thing that sellers of computer products (as well as of other products) must make sure of is that the instructions and guarantee conditions are in the Slovak language.

From the standpoint of the Slovak language, the law on the state language is virtually meaningless. The Slovak language also does not require any special protection because "it is not necessary to protect something that is incapable of developing. But our language has full value." These are the words of Ivor Ripka, director of the Ludovít Štur Linguistics Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, who, nevertheless, in a contradictory manner, considers the law to be useful.... In connection with another matter, I. Ripka hopes that the continuation of comprehensive Slovakistic research will not be threatened. And this is a hope entertained by all of our linguistics specialists—and certainly not by them alone. And this is so despite the fact that the law on the state language in Section 2, Paragraph 1, Letter b charges the state with conducting comprehensive research in the Slovak language, but, at the same time, in Section 11, Paragraph 4 proscribes such research because for purposes of state-supported research only the state language codified by the Ministry of Culture may be investigated.

It is worth noting that, according to Milan Ferko, the "provisions of the law do not apply to firms that, although located in Slovakia, do business abroad." In practical terms, this nonsensical explanation would mean that such a firm might do its accounting, for example, in Japanese, and it would be a problem for the Office of Taxation to figure out how to check on it.

In the coming months, it is possible to anticipate additional "legal" acts of arbitrariness as well as arbitrary explanations on the part of the Ministry of Culture. However, what those interested parties (and these include all legal entities as well as private individuals that fall under the jurisdiction of Slovak Republic legislation) unfortunately fail to realize is the fact that we continue to be only in the warm-up phase. The hard "entertainment" will not, however, begin until 1 January 1997, when the ministry will be authorized to assess fines, which certainly no one will pay without a court order. It will be useful to prepare for that phase now. Preparations should mostly be made by those entities that are a thorn in the side of the current government power.

Slovakia: Poll Shows Even Coalition Supporters Distrust Police

AU2205160796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
18 May 96 p 3

[Report by "vy": "Distrust of the Slovak Information Service and the Police Prevails"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Distrust prevails strongly over trust in the citizens' attitudes toward the Slovak Information Service [SIS]. Attitudes toward the police tend to be more favorable, but even here distrust is more widespread than trust. This transpires from a public opinion poll conducted during the last week of April, the results of which were made available to PRAVDA by the FOCUS agency on Friday [17 May]. Trust in the SIS was expressed by 17.8 percent of respondents, distrust by 60 percent, and 22.2 percent were unable to reply. Distrust of the SIS dominates, according to the poll, among men and women of all ages and educational categories, in all regions of Slovakia, and among citizens of Slovak and Hungarian nationality alike. Above-average distrust of the SIS is characteristic of respondents with a higher level of education, and unequivocal distrust prevails among supporters of opposition parties. But the SIS does not enjoy trust even among the majority of supporters of the government coalition parties—it is trusted by 31.1 percent of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] supporters, 47.4 percent of Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] supporters, and 51.8 percent of Slovak National Party [SNS] supporters. The police emerged from the poll in a somewhat more positive light than the SIS, although the police, too, are more distrusted than trusted by citizens. Asked about their trust of the police, 44.3 percent of respondents replied positively, while 49.8 percent expressed distrust.

Level of Trust of Police, SIS

	Police	SIS
	Percent	
Definitely trust	6.8	4.2
Trust more than distrust	37.5	13.6
Distrust more than trust	35.1	24.2
Definitely distrust	14.7	35.8
Do not know	5.9	22.2

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The police were trusted by 58.7 percent of HZDS sympathizers (and distrusted by 39.2 percent), 52.6 percent of ZRS supporters, 49.4 percent of Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) supporters, 48.2 percent of SNS supporters, 46.8 percent of Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) supporters, 45.2 percent of Democratic Party supporters, 36.7 percent of nonvoters and undecided

voters, 36.4 percent of Hungarian Coalition supporters, and 34.7 percent of Democratic Union supporters.

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 18 May on page 1 publishes the above table on the results of the above FOCUS poll, which was conducted from 23 to 30 April 1996 and involved a sample of 1,332 respondents]

Hungary: Government Said Planning To Buy Swedish Aircraft*AU2405094196 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 22 May 96 p 7*

[Article by Zsolt Nemeth: "International Tender Should Decide Purchase of Fighter Planes—Does the Government Want To Force a Situation on Parliament?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Preparations for probably the biggest weapons purchase of the near future are being made in the greatest secret in Hungary. The Hungarian Government plans to buy fighter aircraft for its army for \$1 billion—equivalent to some 150 billion forints. While those involved almost uniformly claim that our Air Force definitely needs modernization, the suspicion is also growing that the government actually sees the deal as finished. The order will probably be given to the Swedish SAAB factory's Gripen fighters in any case. According to experts, the only way to find out why some government circles are so committed to SAAB would be to listen to the "black box."

Like a bolt from the blue it came to light last autumn that the prime minister would sign or had signed an economic framework agreement with the Swedish Government. Whatever became public from this document proves that the contract actually defines the framework of the fighter plane purchase. It has not become clear up to now how the Swedes got into such a favorable position for the deal. It is said that they approached the Defense Ministry's leaders in the previous governmental cycle but then they were told that it was too early to talk about this, no tenders were yet to be put out.

Feverish Haste Behind the Scenes

However, the Horn cabinet has made the framework agreement. Today it seems that the contents of this are the guiding lines of fighter aircraft purchase. A number of agreements with time limits follow each other in it, a very important one already expired on 28 February. At the beginning of March, the government made its decision public in which it states that the Gripens meet expectations. Hearing this, many people again looked up suddenly because neither the military aviation experts nor the parliamentary defense committee's members had actually expressed what sort of planes we needed. First the needs and then the possibilities should be assessed, this could be followed by market research, and then the invitation for offers.

However, the situation is even more controversial than this because parliamentary decision should define whether the army should buy fighter planes. The Defense Ministry must submit the draft for this. After parliamentary approval, the government can act in the

spirit of the decision to buy planes. Therefore, while the draft for the parliamentary decision had not been prepared, the defense committee did not discuss such material, but the government declared that the Gripens were suitable in all respects. The cabinet's haste is understandable because the framework agreement also states that the deal has to be completed by 31 December this year, otherwise the Swedes will withdraw from it. There is a justified fear that the government wants to make parliament face a fait accompli. According to the latest news, increasing the uncertainty, information has come to light that a three-point draft was formed in the Finance Ministry on the modernization of our air force. According to this, the original idea remains: We buy new fighter planes for \$1 billion. According to the second point, the purchase will be made but over a much longer period. Their third proposal is a minimal program that includes the maintenance of the current level and some development. Therefore, while on one hand haste and an early commitment can be seen, speculations are appearing in the domestic and foreign press on the future deal, the idea of postponing the purchase for economic considerations is also raised.

New Foreign Policy Direction?

All experts agree that our air force also has to be modernized as part of the military forces' reform. Due to the difficult economic situation, financial considerations will also influence the final decision. Today it seems that most people support the purchase of new planes. However, for someone to buy 30 to 40 new fighter planes, the order has to be indicated four to five years in advance. By the turn of the century, our fighter planes will be technically and legally completely outdated, only the recently acquired MiG-29's are an exception. Today, buyers can choose from U.S., French, Swedish, and Russian planes on the world market. However, the Swedish SAAB product is definitely a cuckoo's egg because it has never been tried in battle or live conditions. It is a so-called catalogue plane. Everything it can or cannot do can only be found out from the product information. In reality, it was a weapon of the former politically neutral countries, and its former buyers have also now abandoned it. The Finnish Government was the latest one to withdraw from making a contract, for a very good reason: The Americans did not show willingness to supply weapons for the fighter plane.

Recently, a parliamentary committee in Sweden has been examining the incredibly increased costs of the fighter plane's production. This was a logical step, because the development and production of a plane of which only 100 have so far been manufactured

cannot possibly compete in price with those of which thousands have been made. Therefore, it is also difficult to figure out from this point of view, too, what is pushing the Hungarian Government into this deal. If the purchase of the non-NATO member Sweden's products was a declaration of a kind of new neutrality or noncommitment, this would also suggest a new foreign policy orientation. However, this could obviously only be done with parliament taking a stance and approving it.

A purely professional issue requires further answers. If Hungary, as it has officially declared, wants to join NATO, then compatibility can be a guiding line in its weapon purchases. Obviously, deep down, in the electronics, the Gripen software is different from the NATO standard. While our civilian aviation control follows the U.S model, can the impossible situation arise that our army is not compatible with NATO?

Civilian Control Cannot Be Endangered

However, let us not run ahead in time. At the moment, the basic issues of defense rest on parliamentary

consensus—although the latest tank purchase seems to contradict this. In the defense committee, government side and opposition deputies have solved their differences of opinion through compromise as far as possible. It is a good example of civilian control over the army that the preparation of the purchase of the fighter planes is observed by a government side and an opposition deputy. It could seriously harm the country's international assessment if the government were to force its will on parliament. Only one good political and economic solution exists: the announcement of an international tender and the acceptance of the truly best offer. This of course also means that neither the parliamentary deputies nor the public should be brainwashed with information suggesting that the Swedish offer is economically the best. All applicants make their offer attractive with allowances. However, it must not be forgotten that, in all cases—including the purchase of the Gripen—the fighter planes must be bought with cash.

B-H: EU Administrator: Mostar Elections To Be Held Mid-June*LD2405111696 Madrid RNE International in Spanish 1000 GMT 24 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Spaniard Ricard Perez Casado, the European Union administrator of the city of Mostar, announced today that the municipal elections in Mostar, initially scheduled for 31 May, will be held in mid-June under an agreement between Croats and Bosnian Muslims.

B-H: Casado Says Mostar Refugees To Vote in Election*AU2405100896 Paris AFP in English 0942 GMT*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 24 (AFP)—The EU administrator of Mostar, Ricardo Perez Casado, said Friday that elections in the southern town had been delayed until "the second half of June."

The European Union is organising the municipal elections which had been scheduled to take place on May 31.

Perez Casado told a press conference here that the basis of an agreement had been reached after "many meetings," with the parties involved.

"First is to postpone the elections for the second half of June," he said.

The elections are intended to help reunite the Herzegovina town, which is divided between Muslims and Croats.

Perez Casado said an agreement had been reached between Croats and Muslims to allow refugees from Mostar to vote.

"It's an agreement on the basis of which all Mostar citizens registered in 1991 will be able to vote and will do so in the best political conditions," he said.

Six mainly-Muslim parties had threatened to boycott the elections if the refugees were not allowed to take part. Mostar currently has a Croat majority whereas before the war it had a Muslim majority.

Perez Casado said there would be another meeting Saturday to finalise the arrangements.

The European Union, which has administered the town since 1994 when 11 months of Croat-Muslim clashes ended, is organising the municipal elections. On Thursday an EU spokesman would not confirm reports that they had been delayed.

The elections will be Bosnia's first post-war poll.

They are seen as a test of the viability of the Muslim-Croat Federation which along with the Serbs' Republika Srpska makes up Bosnia-Herzegovina under the terms of the Dayton peace accords.

B-H: Zubak Announces Agreement on Mostar Elections*LD2405125396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1147 GMT 24 May 96*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 24 (TANJUG)—President of the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina Kresimir Zubak announced on Friday that an agreement between Croats and Muslims on Mostar elections could be signed on Saturday since they had agreed about voting of refugees from the town.

European Mostar administrator Ricardo Perez Casado will announce a new election date since the Muslim side rejected May 31, Zubak said.

Zubak (a Croat) said an agreement had been reached to enable all Mostar citizens who wish to vote and who are now living abroad to come to the town on the day of the elections and to unhindered return to the country in which they have refugee status.

For those who do not wish to come to the town, or are unable to do so, voting will be organised in special offices abroad which should be set up by the European Union.

Assistant of international high representative for Bosnia Michael Steiner confirmed on Thursday Croats and Muslims agreed to hold elections in Mostar but the voting would certainly be postponed.

The ruling Muslim Party of Democratic Action and several opposition parties said they would boycott elections if people who had left Mostar are not allowed to vote.

Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic said that some 30,000 people who had fled Mostar during the war were now living abroad. He asked for them to be allowed to vote by mail or in Muslim embassies.

B-H: Report Claims Casado Forced Tudjman Into Mostar Accord*AU2405142196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 24 May 96*

[Report by Nada al Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday's talks between Tudjman and [EU Administrator for Mostar] Casado were

held behind very closed doors indeed, without any reporters around, so it is only today that we have found out some important details about how the talks went and how the results were reached.

We have found out on the Croatian political scene today that the talks were very sharp and that Casado was uncompromising in his demand that the Mostar elections be postponed. He gave irrefutable arguments: That as many as 73 percent of the Mostar population, mostly Bosniaks, had been expelled from Mostar during the Croat-Bosniak clashes, that most of them would not be able to vote if the elections were held on 31 May, and that the Croats were now in the majority, so the elections would be unfair to the Bosniaks, who were in the minority—this Casado said openly—and still could not return. Casado set a condition: Either the elections are postponed until all the Mostar people return home or the vote goes ahead abroad as well.

As we have found out today on the Croatian political scene and from sources in the presidential palace, Tudjman did not dare ask for such a long delay in the elections—until everybody is back home—since that would probably have caused too much of a revolt among the Croats in the so-called west Mostar, so a compromise was reached: Expelled Bosniaks will be allowed to vote abroad in four countries, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Casado accepted the demand of the Republic of Croatia that votes should not be cast in the Bosnia-Herzegovina diplomatic missions in the world but rather in places determined by the EU. This is where the compromise is: It is not the happiest of solutions since there are Bosniaks, too, in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and so on, and the countries where they can vote are too far away for them. However, compromises are always painful and unjust to one of the sides. In the case of the Mostar elections, this is the Bosniaks, who only want a unified and undivided city. That is why they are persistent in their demand that they be allowed to vote.

B-H: Voters' Registration for Elections To Begin 8 Jun

LD2305221996 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2205 GMT 23 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, May 23 (TANJUG)—Registration of voters for parliamentary elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina is set to begin on June 8 and to be completed by July 19, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Banja Luka office said on Thursday.

Office spokesman Thomas Miglierina told a press briefing that the registration of political parties had begun on May 7 and should end by June 7, both in the (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska and in the Muslim-Croat federation.

British Lieutenant-Colonel David Shaw, spokesman for the NATO-led multinational peace implementation force (IFOR) sector southwest, said that all three sides had recalled troops and armament to barracks.

This has made it possible for IFOR to turn to non-military jobs—repairing of roads, the water supply system and other facilities, he added.

International police spokesman Alan Roberts said that all checkpoints had been dismantled and that new ones could be set up only with the consent of the international police and could have no more than three Republika Srpska [word indistinct] each.

Roberts said that the Serb side was cooperating in full.

B-H: Zubak, UNHCR Envoy Discuss Return of Muslims to Stolac

LD2305195896 Sarajevo BH PRESS
in Serbo-Croatian 1647 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 May (BH PRESS)—Kresimir Zubak, the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, today received UNHCR special envoy Soren Petersen and discussed the return of refugees.

Petersen told BH PRESS that it was agreed that representatives of the displaced persons and authorities in Stolac should hold a meeting to determine the exact date for the return of Bosniaks to Stolac.

Petersen told President Zubak that the UNHCR is prepared to provide the building material so that the Bosniaks can return to Stolac as soon as possible.

"It has been made clear to President Zubak that the statement he made a few days ago—that the return of Bosniaks to Stolac is not possible because UNHCR has not provided the building material—in effect is not true," Petersen said.

He added that both the Stolac authorities and the displaced people will be informed that the building material is at their disposal.

"President Zubak has promised that people and officials of Stolac will offer their full support for the return of the refugees and displaced persons, as well as for the delivery of the necessary building material," Petersen said, and added that there were no obstacles to the return of refugees.

He expressed hope that people will be able to return to Stolac just as the building material necessary for the repair of their houses arrived. The return of 100 families has already been agreed upon.

B-H: Official Protests Handing Over 7 Muslims to Serbs

*AU2305194896 Paris AFP in English
1937 GMT 23 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 23 (AFP)—A Bosnian official on Thursday condemned the handing over by the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) of seven Bosnian Muslims to Serb police two weeks ago.

Earlier this week, the United Nations reported the seven had been "tortured" by the Serb police in the eastern Bosnian town of Zvornik after a US unit in IFOR to whom they had surrendered handed them over to the Serbs on May 10.

Amor Masovic, chairman of the Bosnian state's commission for missing people, said handing the seven over to the Serbs was "violating the most essential norms of international humanitarian law and laws governing war."

The seven, whose identity remains unclear, were handed over to the Serbs because they were in possession of handguns and knives.

Although they have supplied names to IFOR, these have yet to be verified.

According to Masovic, the seven were "people who in July last year...were registered by the commission as missing persons," after the fall of the Srebrenica.

"The seven survived the nightmare of Srebrenica and have been hiding for a year," Masovic said. He added "alleged" international concern about the men was "hypocritical."

Serb authorities have not allowed UN police to photograph the Moslem detainees.

They have told UN police, to whom they now have access, they were a group of refugees from the Moslem enclave of Srebrenica which was overrun by rebel Serbs last July and had been hiding in woods around the town of Zepa until being attacked by a group of three armed Serbs on the route for Tuzla on May 10.

When attacked they surrendered to IFOR, they said.

The Serbs have accused them of being a Moslem "terrorist group" who, they said, had murdered a group of Serb wood cutters in the area.

Masovic's comments mark the second time in two weeks the Bosnian authorities have protested over the treatment of the seven men.

B-H: Muratovic Criticizes Election Rules, IFOR

*AU2405124696 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian
15-22 May 96 pp 5-6*

[Interview with Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Zehrudin Isakovic; place and date not given: "There Is Enough Money for the Time Being, but the Key Problem Is Our Total Lack of Organization"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Isakovic] The coming elections in Mostar are a burning issue. All objections boil down to the statement that the rules "legalize ethnic cleansing." Could you have done something to change that situation?

[Muratovic] Yesterday I had a meeting with Mr. Casado, the administrator of Mostar, and after that, this morning, I had a talk with Mr. Zubak [president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina], to see what he thinks about it. Casado said that very soon he should know the decision of the Council of Ministers about the elections and he also told me about a personal attitude of his, which is very interesting. Namely, he thinks that it is better to have any sort of elections and then establish the institutions of the Federation, rather than to live without any institutions or legal authorities. The truth is that in Mostar there are no institutions which are in compliance with the Constitution. But I told him that the official view of the government was that the people who lived in Mostar in 1991 should vote. If those people who are in Mostar today were to vote, it would not reflect the real picture, because they were not inhabitants of Mostar before the war, and they will not be inhabitants of Mostar when the Dayton agreement is realized, that is, when everybody returns to their homes. Therefore, according to the election rules as they are now, they are a legalization of ethnic cleansing. Unfortunately, I believe that the EU will do everything to have the elections held on 31 May.

[Isakovic] Despite your objections?

[Muratovic] Despite our objections. I was warned by Casado: "It would be very bad if you boycotted the elections!"

[Isakovic] Does that mean that you have to accept the legalization of the situation created by the war and the ethnic exodus?

[Muratovic] Elections held in that way are really bad for us, because we will get authorities to govern Mostar

that do not reflect the structure of the population and which would certainly not suit the voters if they had the opportunity to vote.

[Isakovic] With regard to that situation, is it a lesser evil to boycott the elections and have to take the consequences, or to accept them and then get all that you have just spoken about?

[Muratovic] I believe that the people who decide on this will have to accept our reasons and change the rules. I must repeat: It would be very bad if the elections were held according to the existing rules.

[Isakovic] You asked Mr. Casado quite concretely to change the election rules?

[Muratovic] Yes, I requested that all those who had been registered in the 1991 census should vote, regardless of where they are now, which means that the people who are abroad at the moment would also have the right to vote. The present rules do not allow people abroad to vote, except if they appear in person.

[Isakovic] What was Mr. Casado's comment on your arguments?

[Muratovic] He says that he understands that this is now a major problem. I told him that I thought that the European ministers would not make the final decision, but that they would leave that to him. He said that, if it was left up to him, he would make the decision on 13 May in the evening. Despite my insistence, he did not tell me what his decision would be.

[Isakovic] Unfortunately, there are traps in the election rules that affect the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina!

[Muratovic] Yes. The rules are very similar to those that were defined by the EU for Mostar. There is an article that allows the voters to vote for representatives for the place where they are now. That means that all the Serbs who left Sarajevo and went, for example, to Bratunac and now form a majority there will also elect the authorities in Bratunac. That is the essence.

[Isakovic] And can nothing be done about this?

[Muratovic] All the parties have protested. I expect that it still has to be considered.

[Isakovic] Is it realistic to expect changes to the election rules?

[Muratovic] I believe that they will have to change the controversial article; otherwise there is a serious chance of the elections being boycotted. The parties that have objected will probably not agree to take part unless their demands are fulfilled. In that case, there would be no one participating in the elections.

[Isakovic] There are some major problems and not only in relation to the elections. On several occasions you have complained about IFOR [Implementation Force]. You are not alone in this. Some people are calling their engagement an "occupation." What is your cooperation like at this moment?

[Muratovic] IFOR has started to change its mission insofar as they have started helping more with the economic reconstruction, which means that they are carrying out certain projects. As for what you call occupation, I must say that it is very difficult for us. There are parts of the contract that are causing us major problems. For example, our government has still not moved into the building that we planned for the government, because we cannot get the Egyptian battalion out of the barracks in Bistrik [district of Sarajevo], although we have provided appropriate accommodation for them in the Marsal Tito barracks [in central Sarajevo].

[Isakovic] Do you know why they are refusing to leave Bistrik?

[Muratovic] They never say that they will not go; they say that this or that still has to be done.... But, in any case, they do not leave. They have been postponing it for four months now. There is also a very typical case in Bugojno. There are some British forces there, accommodated in three factories, and they do not want to go, although we have provided alternative accommodation for them in which, true, they have to invest a little money, but it is normal for them to accrue some costs while they are here. Because of this, because of such things—and there are many such things—we cannot start reconstruction. Then, we have problems of basic movement. You know that I, as prime minister, have not been allowed to fly in a helicopter several times, because IFOR has the right to control the airspace. They insist that pilots should land at their own risk. The companies cannot accept those conditions. There are also problems concerning payment for damage that has been done by the UN troops and IFOR has taken this over from the UN troops.

[Isakovic] Can you give us an example?

[Muratovic] For example, you have seen what the airport looks like. It is peacetime now and the airport should be put back in the condition in which it was before the war. They dug up millions of cubic meters of earth around the airport. All that should be put back. Second, the other day when I went to Gorazde, I went via the Mts. Igman and Bjelasnica. It is a catastrophe there. Months of work will be needed for those mountains to be put back in a tolerable condition in terms of environment protection. The damage is huge and, according to the contract, they—both the United

Nations and IFOR—are obliged to return every object to the state it was in when they took it over.

We do not have any way to make them fulfill their contractual obligations. I hope that this will not end up before an international court. So, those are the problems that have to do with sovereignty, so to speak.

[Isakovic] On Mts. Igman, Bjelasnica, and Cude near Olovo are there also problems of an ecological nature?

[Muratovic] Yes. There are huge ecological problems. They take surprisingly little care about the environment. If you took a look at it, you would see that everything has been dug up and felled there; they have cut down a lot of forest. IFOR has very heavy vehicles which are still destroying roads that are already very bad anyway. At the moment, it is almost impossible to calculate the damage that has been done by them.

[Isakovic] You meet with General Leighton Smith regularly. How would you appraise his engagement?

[Muratovic] I think that he does his work very professionally. He obeys the contract, particularly when the contract suits them. The contract is very favorable for them and unfavorable for us. He is ready to do the services we ask of him and very seldomly refuses our logical demands. We have a request that was actually turned down by the EU rather than by them, and that was the accommodation of our units in Mostar. We do not have enough space to accommodate our troops, because they have not given us the Northern Camp [Sjeverni logor], which has always been a barracks. But I can say that I am satisfied with his relationship toward the government and our requests.

[Isakovic] Can you explain to us all the requests related to setting up "Bildt's Television" and to handing over the second channel of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Television to other television station. It seems that considerable media confusion will be created!

[Muratovic] I do not believe that Bildt will do anything that we do not agree to. If it does not suit us, we have the opportunity to prevent them from setting up the station, as it is not a part of any contract. Yesterday, I had a major meeting with the Swiss experts and representatives who are financing the project related to the media. They told us the conditions under which they are offering this and we told them which of those conditions we accepted and which we asked to be changed.

[Isakovic] Can you tell us something more about the "media project?"

[Muratovic] That is a project which should establish radio diffusion almost throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. It

implies four mobile stations to broadcast the programs, then stations in all the bigger cities, as well as several relays to provide reception of such a unique program throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. That program would be broadcast by the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]; it would be their radio station. We have posed certain conditions concerning the programs. Concretely, we have asked them not to broadcast news except that related to the elections, because we have our own radio stations for other things. Nowhere in the world is there a country in which someone can start a radio station and broadcast news as he likes. We ask that they broadcast political programs exclusively related to the elections. As regards music, we have also asked that they do not play the newly composed folk music, because that music would include stuff composed in Pale and elsewhere, which could have propagandistic character. Besides, something like that would only spoil our authentic culture. We talked about that for a long time. An important detail of the contract is who owns the equipment, that is, who will be the owner of the equipment when it is all over. I asked for the entire equipment to be left to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina or to the Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They still have not agreed to this. They have offered to leave us the fixed equipment, they have offered leasing, but I still believe that after September—when the broadcasting of their programs should end—they should leave all the equipment to the state. This all concerns radio. There have been many meetings about television, but we still have no final project.

[Isakovic] Where does the problem lie? There was talk that foreigners would be repairing all the relays so that the programs could be seen throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and that in turn the Bosnia-Herzegovina Television would hand over its second channel to be used by them?

[Muratovic] Those were our ideas. They even had some absurd ideas. We advised them build the infrastructure for the reception of two channels throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and that at the time of the elections one channel should be put at their disposal. However, it did not go any further. In fact, I said that the main media in Bosnia-Herzegovina was radio, not television. For example, I have been in Sanski Most and could not watch any television, although the city was full of people. That is a big city in which there are now a small number of television sets. Only in the biggest cities that were not occupied by the Serbs people do still have the chance to watch television. So, in my opinion, television, which is the main media in the West, is not that here.

[Isakovic] The appraisals of Bildt's engagement are mostly negative. You often meet Mr. Bildt, just as you meet Gen. Smith; do you share those appraisals?

[Muratovic] I draw a distinction between two things; that is, I separate two things that perhaps should not be separated. I distinguish the office of the high representative from Carl Bildt himself. There are many people in his office who work directly with us much more than he does. There is Mr. Steiner, who has daily direct contacts with both us and the Serb side for hours. Bildt is the "high representative" and he often deals with what we call "high politics." They have been doing much more lately than they did in the beginning and there are certain results, certain activities on the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which we should not deny. Bildt personally helped us to organize the donors' conference. He has also made some personal efforts to animate the donors. Yet, an overall appraisal can not yet be made. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bildt, Brcko Authorities Discuss Aid, Elections
LD2305163696 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian
1400 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community responsible for the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement, has paid a visit to Brcko. Here is a report by Marko Draganic:

[Draganic] Miodrag Pajic, president of the Brcko municipal assembly, familiarized the high-ranking guest with the current situation in this town. He stressed the problem of the reception and accommodation of the large number of displaced persons, and appealed to the international community to send the aid it had promised in terms of building material.

Mr. Carl Bildt said the international community can provide a great deal of assistance but in return will demand greater readiness to cooperate than before. According to him, the main task of the Serb Republic is to urgently appoint an arbiter for the envisaged arbitration over the disputed border between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation in this town. Among other things, he emphasized that in the arbitration, the border line could be shifted in favor of the Serb Republic or in favor of the Muslim-Croat Federation.

He insisted, in particular, on the establishment of economic cooperation between the entities, and here he also mentioned the establishment of telephone links, where the international community has come up against political obstacles on both sides. [passage omitted]

The meeting also sent a sharp protest to the central electoral commission for placing this town in the Tuzla-Podrinje canton for the purposes of the lists for the coming elections. Mr. Bildt replied that this error arose because of the international community's lack of knowledge of the factual situation on the ground. [passage omitted]

Apart from Bildt and Pajic, the meeting was also attended by Radoslav Bogicevic, president of the Brcko municipal government, and Serb Republic Education Minister Nedeljko Rasula, and Bosko Varesic, people's deputy from Brcko.

B-H: Sacirbegovic: Foreign Fighters Issue 'Dealt' With

AU2305174996 Paris AFP in English
1738 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 23 (AFP)—The Bosnian government has been presented by the United States with a list of "foreign fighters" whose presence in the country violates the Dayton peace accord, a senior Bosnian official said Thursday.

Mohamed Sacirbegovic, special adviser to President Alija Izetbegovic, told reporters "a number of names—fewer than 10—were provided to us," by the Americans.

However, he added, "the issue has been dealt there."

"There were fewer than 10. This should be the end of it," he said.

Sacirbegovic declined to identify the foreign fighters, who reports in Sarajevo said were Iranians.

Under the Dayton peace treaty, all foreign forces, other than the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) should have left Bosnia by mid-January.

B-H: Report Claims 50 Mujahidin Still in Zenica Area

AU2305101096 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 18 May 96 pp 14-15

[Report by Damir Karakas: "'Allah's Threat' From Zenica's Suburbs"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] How many mujahidin are there left on Bosnia-Herzegovina's soil? And how dangerous is their presence to the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Although some Muslim leaders claim categorically that there are no "Allah's Warriors" in Bosnia, some unpleasant incidents in central Bosnia recently tell a quite different story. Namely, the best evidence that many of Allah's fighters, despite Dayton, are still in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a group of members

of the supposedly disbanded El Mujahid unit, which is still being billeted in the Zenica suburb of Podbriježje.

Still functioning as a separate military formation, the group of these mujahidin fighters, carrying various weapons and dressed in traditional costumes, has made a veritable military fortress out of several houses in this formerly Croatian village; they deny access to it by keeping their fingers on the triggers and using vicious dogs. Relations between Allah's fighters and the Croatian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina was certainly best expressed in an incident that occurred on the biggest Islamic festival, Bayram, when a group of irritable foreign citizens, joined by a group of local Muslims, went through a varied repertoire of Islamic worship in the center of Podbriježje. Although, without a doubt, there are a number of mosques in the Zenica region where they could have been worshipping, they performed this program in the center of a Croatian village, shouted insults, and taunted the frightened Croatian population.

Two Bombs at the Catholic Church!

However, that was only one of the many recent events in the Zenica region in which Islamic fanatics have provoked Croats.

For example, one of the most recent incidents, which could have led to much more serious consequences, happened in Zenica itself. During morning mass, unknown persons hurled two unidentified explosive devices at the church, but fortunately there were no casualties.

"On the subject of the mujahidin in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I should say that some of them have really left, in line with the Dayton agreement, but a group of them have stayed in Podbriježje, a suburb of Zenica, where their base used to be," says Fra Stipan Radic, the parish priest at the St. Elias Church in Zenica, adding that, "From what I know, they are members of the El Mujahid unit, who were attached to the 3rd Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. A long time ago they became independent, organized autonomous operations, and caused great difficulties for both the Muslim military and political structures in Zenica."

In his words, in the Croatian village of Podbriježje, there are still some 50 fanatical mujahidin and their presence is a constant threat to the local inhabitants. Those members of the El Mujahid who left Bosnia returned to Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and other Islamic countries, that is, back where they came from, but those who stayed are registered as so-called humanitarian workers, some even diplomats. Some of them, as could be expected, have married and have thus become citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nobody really knows

what will happen with them and when they will really leave, says a frightened Fra Stipan, pointing out that among these mujahidin fighters there are many local Muslims who have joined them and put themselves to under their command.

"They are a law unto themselves around Zenica. We know that there are not many of them, but nobody dares approach them or give them any orders," an anonymous Federation army officer says, emphasizing that the remaining mujahidin are a great burden and a threat to the locals, because they will stop at nothing to impose their fanatical world view on people. [passage omitted]

B-H: Zvornik Council Warns Bildt, Smith of Serb Terrorism

AU2305155196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The transitional Municipal Council of the Zvornik municipality has sent an open letter to Leighton Smith and Carl Bildt in which it is informing and warning them about the increasingly frequent terrorist acts by the Serb side in that area.

The Serb authorities started a new form of action against the civilian population in the residential area of Dugi Dio at 0300 this morning, which can only be done by those with criminal minds. They blew up two residential buildings and one auxiliary building. The situation in the free Zvornik area is serious, even dramatic. You know that the Serb authorities do not respect the Dayton agreement, but we are surprised that you are not reacting to the behavior that is in opposition to the peace agreement, the letter says among other things.

B-H: Steiner Confident Dayton Accords Will Be Attained

LD2305213796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2058 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, May 23 (TANJUG)—The international community's envoy for the civilian implementation of the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia said in Banja Luka on Thursday that the aims of the accords would be attained despite slow progress in their implementation. Deputy high representative Michael Steiner was speaking at a press conference after meeting with Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic and Roman Catholic bishop in that biggest city in the (Bosnian Serb) Republika Srpska Franjo Komarica.

They discussed the implementation of the accords, economic matters, repatriation of refugees, and upcoming

elections. Steiner stressed he was sure that the Serbs want peace and openness to Europe. In connection with a possible referendum on confidence in Republika Srpska President Radovan Karadzic and top state leaders, Steiner said that the Republika Srpska was free to organize such a referendum before elections.

However, he added, that would strengthen the position of some personages, which is not in keeping with the Dayton accords.

Steiner said that the situation in the media was unsatisfactory both in the Republika Srpska and in the Muslim-Croat federation, and announced a number of new projects that should result in the parties' greater accessibility to the media before the elections.

B-H: Official Criticizes IFOR for Hypocrisy Over Detainees

LD2305162796 Sarajevo BH PRESS
in Serbo-Croatian 1158 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 23 May (BH PRESS)—In connection with the frequent speculation by international community officials regarding the identity of seven Bosniaks who were handed over to the authorities in the Serb entity by IFOR [Implementation Force], Amor Masovic, chairman of the state commission [unspecified], in a public statement, says the seven individuals concerned were listed by the state commission as missing immediately after the occupation of Srebrenica in July 1995.

The International Committee of the Red Cross was acquainted with these facts. These were people who survived the Srebrenica Golgotha and who then spent a whole year hiding from bearded figures, before being handed over to their tormentors by the forces of the international community that should have protected them.

So, we consider the ostensible concern of the international mediators for the life and health of these people to be extremely hypocritical, the statement says, among other things. [passage omitted]

Do the representatives of the international community know about the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention, which forbid handing over soldiers to anyone except their own authorities or protectors? So, gentlemen of IFOR, the international police force, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: do not allow the blood of these unfortunate people from Srebrenica, shed in Zvornik prison, to upset your upcoming annual holidays, the public statement issued by Amor Masovic, chairman of the state commission, says, among other things.

B-H: Poll: Bosnians Believe IFOR Could Arrest War Criminals

AU2405111196 Paris AFP in English
1048 GMT 24 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 24 (AFP)—Two thirds of Bosnians think that the NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) is capable of arresting the suspected war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic but is unwilling to do so, a Sarajevo daily said Friday.

Asked if the 60,000-strong IFOR is capable of arresting the pair, 66 percent of those questioned answered "Yes, but it does not want to," the daily paper AVAZ said.

The paper, which said it interviewed 300 people in the Bosnian cities of Sarajevo, Zenica and Tuzla this week, said 14 percent of people said IFOR wants to arrest the Serb duo and will do so "very soon."

Eleven percent of people said "No, because it was not part of IFOR's mandate."

Nine percent of people said they did not know.

Karadzic and Mladic were indicted last year for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.

B-H: Germany's Ruehe Says IFOR Mission To 'End as Scheduled'

LD2305193496 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1903 GMT 23 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, May 23 (TANJUG)—German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe said Thursday that the Implementation Force (IFOR) had created conditions for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina to begin.

Ruehe told reporters that the troops of all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be "neutralized by the elections scheduled for mid-September" and their heavy weapons would be in storage by mid-June.

The German minister said IFOR's mission would end as scheduled, by the end of the year and only "organizational reasons" could move the departure of the Implementation Force for after the new year's.

Ruehe said "the responsibility for a common future and peace rests with the people there, Muslims, Croats and Serbs...peace must come from within."

B-H: IFOR Reportedly Approved Mladic's Flight to Belgrade*AU2405144196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 24 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] German Foreign Minister Kinkel has assessed that the days of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic are numbered; however, he did not explain where and how they are to be captured. This question has become even more pressing because, in the meantime, Gen. Mladic returned to Pale last night.

It has also been learned that the commander of the Bosnian Serb army traveled to Belgrade in a helicopter on Tuesday and that the Implementation Force (IFOR) approved the flight. IFOR representatives in Sarajevo confirmed that they had indeed approved the flight of a military aircraft taking off from Banja Luka. They could not say, however, whether IFOR checked out the passengers in the helicopter in question.

B-H: Dobo, Teslic, Tesanj Officials Discuss Civilian Movement*LD2305172696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1607 GMT 23 May 96*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dobo, May 23 (TANJUG)—The mayors and police chiefs of Dobo, Teslic and Tesanj, towns in the north of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), held a meeting on Thursday to confer about instituting the freedom of movement for civilian population in keeping with the Dayton Accords.

Dobo and Teslic are in the Republika Srpska (R.S., the Serb entity in the BiH) while Tesanj is in the Muslim-Croat Federation in this former Yugoslav republic.

The meeting, held at the Nordic-Polish brigade headquarters in Dobo, was attended by representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

In the past thirty days the Muslims have caused several incidents, killing and hurting several people, when they tried to enter Dobo and some other towns in the R.S. in an unorganized way and without permissions from the Serb authorities and from IFOR (International Force for the implementation of the peace agreement).

B-H: RS's Plavsic: Dayton Agreement Only Solution at Present*LD2305222196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2013 GMT 23 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 23 May (SRNA)—Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS), has said in an interview for tomorrow's issue of GLAS SRPSKI that the Dayton agreement and its application provided the framework for talks in Belgrade between the RS (?delegation) and RS President Slobodan Milosevic.

Plavsic—whom RS President Radovan Karadzic has entrusted with some of his duties—specified that the Serbian president, who was particularly interested in the forthcoming elections in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, was given assurances that the appointment of Slobodan Kovac as Bosnian Serb representative in the electoral commission created all necessary conditions allowing the elections to proceed smoothly.

The talks, also attended by RS Vice President Nikola Koljevic, "took place in an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect," she said.

"With his signature Milosevic confirmed that Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were the guarantors of the Dayton agreement, and therefore it is logical that he was interested in the peace process," Plavsic said, adding that the Serbian president was told that the RS leadership accepted the peace agreement, "convinced it is the only solution that can be implemented at the moment."

Plavsic said that the "Serb Republic leadership is very interested in establishing a stable and permanent peace that would secure the country's successful economic recovery and development," adding that personnel changes in the republican government—in the light of recent events—were also discussed.

"The international community—because of some statements by Mr. Bildt—gained the impression that the 'isolationist leadership from Pale' did not want to implement the Dayton agreement and that Kasagic was the only person to talk to," Plavsic explained and added:

"We told President Milosevic that the Serb Republic People's Assembly accepted the Dayton agreement [words indistinct] within the agreement. There have been some upheavals in the Serb Republic last week, but they could turn out to be for the best. After every upheaval things calm down and the atmosphere is purified."

Plavsic was convinced that the changes in the Serb Republic government were "good" both for the interna-

tional community and Carl Bildt, its representative in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, adding that they now "have a completely clear picture."

"I think that the international community and Bildt have learned a lot from this given that their collocutors are people who are consistent and strong in their stands, which certainly commands respect," concluded RS Vice President Plavsic in her interview for GLAS SRPSKI.

B-H: Plavsic Rules Out Karadzic's Extradition to The Hague

LD2305185896 *Pale Srpska Televizija*
in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Serb Vice President Biljana Plavsic today confirmed that under the Constitution Radovan Karadzic is still the president of the Serb Republic and that he represented the republic. Plavsic said, in an interview for tomorrow's issue of the Belgrade weekly NIN, that the Serb Republic president had used his constitutional right to temporarily entrust some of his duties to one of the vice presidents and that this did not mean that Karadzic has stepped down from his position. This cannot be interpreted as handing over presidential duties to someone else. The president decided that it will be good to leave the contacts with the international community to me, and he will dedicate himself to the myriad internal issues, which are perhaps not very interesting for the media, but are of exceptional importance for the people and their everyday life, Plavsic explained. She ruled out all speculation concerning handing over President Karadzic to the Hague tribunal. She added that she could not think of one single Serb who could do such a thing, not only to Karadzic, but to anyone else who had taken part in our struggle.

B-H: Kasagic Said Arranging Karadzic Arrest in Zagreb

AU2405104796 *Sarajevo SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian*
23 May 96 p 9

[Report by K. Meler: "Secret Visit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The unmarked Audi car, escorted by two others vehicles, stopped on the separation line between the Serb Republic and "Herzeg-Bosnia." It was approached by a high-ranking official in the Croatian Interior Ministry and, following a brief and hearty chat, handed over a license plate with the insignia of the "Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia." Several hours later Rajko Kasagic met Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. However, that was not the end of Kasagic's visit to Zagreb. After his meeting with Tudjman, he met several foreign representatives. In these contacts, Kasagic

hinted that the problem with bringing Karadzic and Mladic to The Hague could be an extremely simple one. What is more, our military sources claim, it could be "arranged" for Karadzic's escort to be slower than usual and to take an unusual turn.

This confirms the information that it was not Karadzic but Kasagic who was on a secret visit to Zagreb recently, and this opens a new dilemma: Was the prime minister replaced because he was arranging Karadzic's arrest and extradition to The Hague in Zagreb?

B-H: Bildt: Karadzic's Actions May Lead to New Sanctions

AU2305125596 *Paris AFP in English*
1242 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 23 (AFP)—The top civilian official implementing the Bosnian peace treaty will consider reimposing crippling sanctions on Serbia if Serb leader Radovan Karadzic continues to "sabotage" the peace process, a top official said Thursday.

Colum Murphy, spokesman for Carl Bildt, said Bildt had already discussed the issue of reimposing sanctions on the Former Republic of Yugoslavia—comprised of Serbia and Montenegro—in talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic this week.

The UN economic sanctions against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia were suspended earlier this year by the United Nations following the signing of the Bosnian peace treaty in December.

Milosevic signed the Dayton treaty as representative of the Bosnian Serbs.

Murphy told a press briefing here the sanctions could be reimposed without the need for a UN Security Council vote within five days of Bildt sending a letter to the Council.

"If he (Karadzic) were to interfere with the process again, or sabotage the Dayton process, we would discuss sanctions and other things urgently with Mr. Milosevic," the spokesman said.

B-H: Pale Reports Foreign Press View of Karadzic's Position

LD2305165396 *Pale Srpska Televizija*
in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign media have been dealing with current political developments in the Serb Republic and assessing President Karadzic's current position.

In locking horns with the political leadership of the Serb Republic, the West has displayed incompetence and suffered political defeat, the German press writes today, commenting on futile attempts to destabilize the Serb Republic. German papers write that ever since he took office, Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community, has been trying to politically isolate and outmaneuver Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic. The paper goes on to say that the Serb Republic leadership has instead gained even more influence.

Meanwhile, Carl Bildt must have become aware of the fact that Karadzic is still the number one politician in the Serb Republic, the German press says, pointing to the fact that a majority of the Serbs seek the unification of their state with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The press recalls that the Serb people view Karadzic as being the greatest guarantee of this goal being achieved, saying that all those who disregard these facts are ignoring the real state of affairs.

The German DIE WELT paper says that the forthcoming referendum in the Serb Republic represents a great danger to U.S. and German diplomacy if President Karadzic and General Mladic receive plebiscitary support from their own people.

Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic has not yielded to pressure from the international community to give up his position, Greek information media say today quoting a report of the Serb news agency [SRNA] that he has only transferred some of his authority to Vice President Biljana Plavsic. In connection with the latest developments on the internal political scene in the Serb Republic, Greek state radio says that Karadzic has once again confirmed himself to be the absolute master of the situation, and that the international community fears more than anything a possible referendum in which the Serb people show support for its leaders.

The U.S. rejected the Hague tribunal request to arrest Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic, commander of the Serb Republic Army. THE NEW YORK TIMES writes today, quoting statements by top State Department officials. Their arrest could threaten U.S. soldiers in the field, the U.S. daily says.

The State Department has also taken seriously President Milosevic's warning that former Bosnia-Herzegovina could soon boil over if someone tries to arrest President Karadzic and Gen. Mladic and hand them over to the Hague tribunal. THE NEW YORK TIMES says, adding that the Hague tribunal judges have not been offered even the slightest hope that NATO troops will hunt down the Serb leaders. The paper says that the same stance has been assumed by NATO officials, adding that no

Western country is prepared to sacrifice its soldiers for such an action.

B-H: UN: Warrants Could Be Issued Against Karadzic, Mladic

LD2305185296 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1814 GMT 23 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 23 (TANJUG)—A U.N. spokesman said here Thursday that international arrest warrants would be issued against Republika Srpska (RS) President Radovan Karadzic and RS Army Commander General Ratko Mladic if evidence supports allegations in the indictments issued against them by the U.N. tribunal for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.

U.N. spokeswoman in Belgrade Susan Manuel told reporters that prosecution at the Hague Tribunal would start presenting evidence against Karadzic and Mladic on May 27.

Tribunal President Antonio Cassese has addressed a letter to the U.N. Security council which contains facts so as to exert pressure and obtain Karadzic's and Mladic's apprehension, Manuel said.

Speaking about the U.N. Transitional Administration in eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), Manuel said that the essential was to build confidence among local people and that it was necessary to convince local Serbs to remain there.

Manuel said demilitarization in the area was being carried out successfully and that most heavy weapons had been withdrawn.

Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem is the only part of the former Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) which has not been seized by the Croatian army.

Under an agreement reached by local Serbs and the Croatian government in 1995, the area will be under U.N. transitional administration for one year with a possibility of extending the U.N. mandate for another year.

Manuel said that the U.N. Security Council had asked Croatia to encompass former U.N. protected areas in its amnesty law.

The Republic of Serb Krajina was a U.N. protected area from which about 250,000 Serbs were expelled by the Croatian army in 1995.

Manuel said that eastern Slavonia would be controlled by 1,800 policemen and that their ethnic structure would reflect the national composition of local population.

About 440 Serb and Croat policemen will be trained in Budapest and later deployed, she said.

The spokeswoman said that UNTAES was now working on mine-removal which was particularly important for the return of refugees.

B-H: Bildt Appeals for More Pressure on Karadzic
AU2405100096 Paris AFP in English
0951 GMT 24 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Paris, May 24 (AFP)—The official implementing the political provisions of the Bosnian peace agreements Friday appealed for more pressure to be applied to Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and other leaders indicted with war crimes to remove them from "any overt political role."

Carl Bildt, who will attend a meeting here later Friday of a steering committee on implementation of the agreements, said Karadzic was having "a particularly poisoning effect on the political atmosphere."

Bildt said he would meet French President Jacques Chirac on Saturday to discuss the means that might be used against Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb military leader, General Ratko Mladic.

The negotiator said the steering committee would review progress made towards staging elections and plans for economic reconstruction.

B-H: Serb Opposition Leader Says Karadzic 'Politically Dead'

LD2305200296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1627 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 May (TANJUG)—Dragutin Ilic, the president of the Socialist Party of the Bosnian Serb Republic [SPRS], said in Belgrade today that the Serb Republic Socialists would decide in August whether to take part in the elections on their own or in a coalition.

In his view, the real election campaign in the Serb Republic would only start in July.

Addressing the Savski Venac [central Belgrade] municipal committee of the [ruling] Socialist Party of Serbia, Ilic said that the SPRS could be optimistic about the outcome of the elections if it had adequate media support, currently denied to this party in the Serb Republic.

He spoke about a number of problems and difficulties facing SPRS activists, all created by the [ruling Bosnian] Serb Democratic Party [SDS] whose members held all the strings of power in their hands.

Singling out [SDS leader] Radovan Karadzic as the most responsible for all this, Ilic said that "when all

the pressure and a chance of manipulation are over the SDS will come down like a house of cards."

"Objectively speaking, Karadzic is politically dead," Ilic said, adding that the SDS leader lost the authority he once had.

Speaking about relations with other parties, the SPRS president specified that he had talks yesterday with representatives of nine [of the 35 registered] parties who all agreed that the elections must not be postponed at any cost, "even if there are certain shortcomings."

"We agreed that we are for peace, for a Serb Republic in a union with Yugoslavia and Serbia, for the departure of Karadzic from the political scene, and for cooperation with the international community," he added.

Ilic believes that the most serious opponent of the Socialists at the elections will be the "SDS and its allies," naming the Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian Patriotic Party as SDS allies.

According to Ilic, the SPRS has to resort to "spoken word and leaflets" because of lack of access to the media, and it will try to make its program, "contained in three words—peace, reconstruction, and development," reach every part of the Serb Republic.

All current SPRS activities are, in his words, directed toward preparations for the party congress, to be held on 1 June in Banja Luka.

B-H: Zvornik Rally Voices Support for Karadzic, Mladic

LD2405150796 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First
Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian
1400 GMT 24 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Several thousand inhabitants of the Drina valley area attended a rally in Zvornik today at which they protested the announced arrival of Muslims from the Tuzla region in Zvornik municipality. The protest meeting saw full support expressed for Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and General Ratko Mladic, commander of the main headquarters of the Serb Republic Army. Here is a report from Zvornik by Milenko Lazarevic:

[Lazarevic] We do not want to live together with Muslims and Croats in some kind of unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina; our state is the Serb Republic and Zvornik is a Serb town—these points were stressed at today's protest meeting in Zvornik, which was attended by several thousand citizens from the Drina valley area. They had come to express their protest against the announced arrival in Zvornik and nearby villages in this

part of the Serb Republic of Muslims from the Tuzla region.

Stevo Radic, president of the Zvornik municipal committee of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), told those attending the rally: Under the guise of freedom of movement and in keeping with the peace agreement, the Muslims are carrying out a new aggression against the Serb Republic and are trying to settle collectively some border areas in the Zvornik municipality. In this they are being aided and abetted by Implementation Force (IFOR) members and the international police force.

Since the beginning of the war, about 25,000 Serb refugees have arrived in Zvornik. They left their homes in order to save their lives. For the time being they do not wish to return to their homes, because in Serb Zvornik they have found new homes, which they will not leave at any price, Radic stressed. He added that members of the Zvornik municipal authorities will not attend a meeting with Muslim leaders from Tuzla, Kalesija, and (Satni) which was scheduled for 31 May 1996 by the High Commissioner for Refugees. There is nothing to discuss with the Muslims until a state border is established between the warring sides, Stevo Radic said.

Word was sent from this people's rally to the international community that Radovan Karadzic is the president of the Serb Republic and Gen. Ratko Mladic is the army commander who inflicted a military defeat on the enemy and created his own state after the shedding of blood.

During the protest meeting, IFOR helicopters flew overhead, demonstrating in this way the international community's attitude to the Serb people in the Serb Republic.

B-H: Serb Speaker Comments on Referendum Issue
LD2305205996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1739 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 23 May (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Serb Republic People's Assembly, today confirmed that an offer was made to the international community in the form of a referendum that will test the credibility of the Serb Republic leadership, on which the parliament will take the final stand. [passage omitted]

"In my view, a referendum should be organized only if the Serb Republic is threatened, and I personally think that such means of voicing public opinion should not be applied unless absolutely necessary," Krajisnik said. [passage omitted]

Krajisnik reiterated that the functioning of the government was an internal issue for the Serb Republic and described as unfounded attempts to classify the Serbs as [politically] suitable or unsuitable, or as supporters or opponents of the Dayton agreement. [passage omitted]

Commenting on Bildt's threats with new sanctions against the Serb Republic and on statements by certain U.S. officials that they will not allow the referendum, Krajisnik said that "this best illustrates the fact that the Serbs are denied their right to self-determination, and that the others are trying to impose on them their will and their interests." [passage omitted]

"If the reply is positive, we will respect the will of the people and tender our resignations, after which there will be a change in the policy," Krajisnik added. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bildt Tells Serbs Foreign Aid Tied to Peace Effort

AU2305211196 Paris AFP in English
2053 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 23 (AFP)—International aid for the Bosnian Serbs is linked to cooperation on the peace accords, Bosnia's top civilian official Carl Bildt said Thursday during a visit to Serb-held territory, Radio Pale reported.

He said the international community was capable of aiding greatly the reconstruction of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina but said the cooperation demanded in return was not currently forthcoming from the Serbs.

US presidential advisor William Montgomery, who went to the northern Serb stronghold of Banja Luka Wednesday, said US aid was conditional on the ouster of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.

The United States and Bildt are currently pressurizing the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia to sideline Karadzic who has been indicted for war crimes.

Earlier Thursday, a spokesman for Bildt said he would consider reimposing crippling sanctions on Serbia if Karadzic continued to "sabotage" the peace process.

During his visit to northern Bosnia, Bildt went to the flashpoint town of Brcko, now held by Serbs but claimed by the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo.

He called on Serbs to name their representative for international mediation on the status of the town, not resolved in the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the radio said.

The Muslim-Croat Federation, the other entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, named its representative, Cazim Sadikovic, a member of the constitutional court, this week.

Brcko is of strategic importance as it links the east and west territories held by the Republika Srpska, the Serb entity, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Serb Vice President Receives OSCE Official in Pale

LD2305185696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1550 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 23 May (TANJUG)—Professor Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Serb Republic, had talks in Pale today with Marten Krasnai [name as received], a special representative of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], on the implementation of the military part of the Dayton agreement.

After the meeting, Koljevic said they discussed military stability, especially Point 2 of the military part of the peace agreement which envisages the establishment of contacts between members of the main headquarters of the Serb Republic and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, the establishment of links and the presence of people in the main headquarters. [sentence as received]

Koljevic expressed the hope that controversial issues will be resolved over the next few days. It was also assessed that Points 4 and 6, which pertain to the regional stability of the military part of the Dayton agreement [as received], are easier and that these should be agreed at meetings in Oslo at the beginning of June.

"If the military part is accomplished, implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement will proceed more smoothly," Koljevic concluded.

Krasnai, otherwise the personal representative of Flavio Cotti, chairman in office of the OSCE Council of Ministers, said that progress was achieved at the meeting in the implementation of the military part of the peace agreement.

"We identified the problems which are hampering further implementation and agreed to resume cooperation on overcoming problems in communications between the two sides," Krasnai said.

B-H: Serb Talks With Foreign Investors Called 'Unsuccessful'

LD2305205496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1915 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 23 May (SRNA)—Nicola Erceg, the director general of the Serb Republic's Electric Power Company, said the talks in Pale today with representatives of the European Bank and the International Management Group were completely unsuccessful.

The representatives of the European Bank and the International Management Group insisted that any financial aid for the repair of the electric power industry in the Serb Republic had to be guaranteed by the Finance Ministry of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which the Serb side refused because this ministry, as well as other bodies of the joint state, does not exist.

Representatives of the Serb Republic's Electric Power Company objected because the Serb delegation had not been invited to the donors' conference in Paris earlier this month. They stressed that the electric power industry in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina had to function, but did not have to have political dimensions. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serbs Call for Ban of Interentity Bus Link

AU2305164996 Paris AFP in English 1630 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 23 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb authorities have said they will ban a bus link between the Serb entity in Bosnia and the Moslem-Croat federation, a spokesman for the UN refugee agency said Thursday.

Serb police Thursday prevented a bus from running between the Moslem-Croat held Sarajevo suburb of Ilidza and the Serb district of Lukavica, Kris Janowski, spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said.

The UNHCR set up the service earlier this month in an attempt to help people bridge the divide between the two entities that make up post-war Bosnia.

Most of the people using the service were Serbs from Sarajevo going to Lukavica to telephone friends in the Serb entity and in Serbia or to collect Serb pensions, Janowski said.

The Serb police told the bus driver the bus was not authorised in the Serb entity because it did not meet "safety standards," Janowski said, adding the Serbs had told the UNHCR they were to seek a complete ban on the service Friday.

The Serb claims about the bus were "complete nonsense and another example of the hostility of the Republika

Srpska authorities to freedom of movement," Janowski said.

The spokesman said if the city bus company running the route decided not to continue the service, the UNHCR would ignore the ban and run its own service.

Croatia: Eastern Slavonia Serbs Reportedly Shelled
*LD2405121296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 24 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Vukovar-Srijem police announced that between 2055 and 2105 last night, Serbs from the temporarily occupied area launched an artillery attack on the general area of the villages of Privlaka and Otok. No one was injured. UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] has been informed of this.

Croatia: Vukovar Deputies Launch Special Status Initiative

*LD2305163596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1331 GMT 23 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar, 23 May (TANJUG)—Deputies at the Municipal Assembly in Vukovar today launched an initiative for special status to be granted to the Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem in Croatia.

At an extraordinary session of the assembly an outline plan for this status was defined; it was said that the status should be based on principles applied in similar cases by Western democratic countries.

According to the plan, the Serb region will have its own assembly and government; the special status will encompass the right to regional nationality and a passport, the region's right to have its own police, its own or another appropriate currency, an education system, a judiciary, the use of the Serb language, the right to a national anthem, coat of arms and banner, and economic self-administration.

In addition, the region will be permanently demilitarized and its citizens will not do national service. The right to vote will be granted to all its citizens who have resided in the region for at least six months. The same criterion will be valid for acquiring regional nationality.

The plan envisages the possibility of the regional assembly adopting legal regulations. However, the Croatian president has the opportunity to veto these regulations if the assembly oversteps its authority.

The Vukovar deputies also demand that Serb regional interests in the Croatian Assembly be defended by a special representative. At the same time, a special Croatian Government envoy will be delegated to the assembly of the region.

The plan on the special status of the Serb region within Croatia also includes the setting up of an expert team that could be called a regional delegation. Half of this team will be made up of Croatian Government

representatives, while the other half will be elected by the regional government.

According to Vukovar Assembly deputies who sent the outline plan to other municipal assemblies in the region (Beli Manastir, Tenja, Mirkovci, and Dalj), the plan secures the preservation of the multiethnic and multiconfessional character of the region.

Croatia: Serb Predicts Direct Talks With Zagreb on E. Slavonia

*LD2405104496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 0838 GMT 24 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar, 24 May (TANJUG)—Current talks with the Croats are being mediated by the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES], but due to UNTAES's lack of understanding and failure to comprehend some political problems, direct talks with Zagreb will begin very soon, Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic, chairman of the executive committee of the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, has told TANJUG.

Summing up the talks thus far on the implementation of the Erdut agreement, Stanimirovic said that so far "the talks have produced only partial results."

"In the field of economic cooperation, for example, we have agreed to a barter deal, under which the Croatian side was to deliver 5,000 tonnes of fertilizer to the Serb region in exchange for agricultural produce. However, there is currently a question mark over this agreement. The Croats have told the executive committee of the Serb region that it is unable to deliver the full quota of [word indistinct], but, most probably, only half the agreed amount," he said.

This has provoked disgust among the Serb population, Stanimirovic said. He added that "the greatest disgust is caused by the partial approach of the Republic of Croatia to the amnesty issue, where political pressure continues to be exerted on the population of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem."

Regarding the return of refugees from western Slavonia who are being cared for in the region [of eastern Slavonia], Stanimirovic said that "a pilot project is under way to return displaced persons, and this involves three villages in the Serb region [of eastern Slavonia] and one in the Republic of Croatia [Kusonje], and this means Croatia has a 5:1 [as received] advantage, which is not permissible."

The authorities in the Serb region [of eastern Slavonia] will insist that in the Okucani region another four or five villages are earmarked for reconstruction work before

talks can go ahead on the return of refugees to western Slavonia or the arrival of Croats in the Serb region, Stanimirovic said.

Zagreb's partial approach is also in evidence as regards the payment of pensions on the basis of rights acquired during the time of the Socialist Republic of Croatia.

"The Croatian side is trying to differentiate between pensioners and circumvent existing records of pension rights, according to which in this region [of eastern Slavonia] there are 18,000 pensioners. An additional provocation is Zagreb's proposal that the pensions be paid in kunas," Stanimirovic said.

The Serb side, he added, "will propose the formation of a mixed bank or an UNTAES bank so that pensions can be paid in a currency acceptable to the population of the region, but only when the problem of the payment of pensions has been fully solved."

Regardless of some disagreements, UNTAES is well received here, Stanimirovic said.

"We are aware that its aim is the peaceful reintegration of our territory within the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia. But we also know that the UNTAES mandate does not define the future status of the Serb region. This will depend on our numbers and the unity of our people in this area," Stanimirovic said.

Croatia: Steiner Says Mostar Elections Might Be Postponed

*LD2305154396 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1515 GMT 23 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 23 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Croats and Muslims have agreed that elections in the city of Mostar, Southern Bosnia, should be held but that the exact date would most probably be postponed, International Mediator Michael Steiner said on Thursday.

"You are aware that the situation in Mostar is very serious," said Steiner who is deputy to the International Community's High Representative for Civilian Questions [as received], Carl Bildt.

Foreign agencies quoted Steiner as saying that following intensive consultations between the representatives of the two sides and the E.U. Administration, it was decided that all who were forced to leave Mostar during the war, should be allowed to vote at the elections.

Steiner said he would guarantee the return of Muslim representatives to the electoral committee and that the E.U. Administration would announce the exact date of the elections.

The ruling Muslim party of Democratic Action (SDA) and several opposition parties said they would boycott the elections following the E.U. Administration's decision not to allow those who left the city during the war to vote at the elections first set for May 31.

Bosnian Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic said that about 30,000 people, mainly Serbs and Muslims, had left the city during the war and that now they live abroad as refugees. Izetbegovic demanded that they be allowed to vote either by post or in Muslim embassies.

Last week Muslim representatives pulled out of the electoral committee and the E.U. representatives announced this would technically postpone the elections.

Muslim-Croat Federation President Kresimir Zubak has said that the Bosnian Croats are willing to accept a 'reasonable' postponement of the elections.

A member of the Sarajevo Muslim Government who asked not to be named, said that the elections would most probably be held in late June.

Croatia: 'Stages' of Srem-Baranja Demilitarization Detailed

*LD2305114996 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1035 GMT 23 May 96*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 23 (TANJUG)—All military and police troops in the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem will by June 21 be demobilized and dissolved and their weapons either removed from the region or turned over to UNTAES (U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia), Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI said on Thursday.

The process is planned to take part in three stages, VECERNJE NOVOSTI said and added that the first stage had already been completed. It involved contacts between the local commands and UNTAES, their precise agreement about the implementation of the demilitarization and the handing over of maps showing mine field locations.

The second stage will last one month and will involve disarmament by June 21, after which no-one will be allowed to carry arms except for UNTAES and the police.

The third stage calls for the destruction of the gathered weapons. The demobbed troops will be allowed to wear their uniforms but without rank insignia.

UNTAES commander General Jozef Schoups of Belgium will be in charge of the demilitarization, but responsibility for the entire process lies with the Slavonia-Baranja Corps command, headed by Major General Dusan Loncar. UNTAES will oversee all activities and provide the necessary support and aid, Gen. Schoups said.

VECERNJE NOVOSTI said that Gen. Loncar faces the biggest challenge of his career as he will personally have to disband the Slavonia-Baranja Corps to help maintain peace.

The demilitarization plan allows the Serb general the possibility of removing the arms from the region or gathering and handing it over to UNTAES to be destroyed later.

Asked who will protect the local population after the demilitarization is completed, and in which way, UNTAES spokesman Phil Arnold said:

'I believe that 5,000 well-armed and specially trained UNTAES troops, correctly spread throughout the region and aided by the local police, will be sufficient guarantee for the safety of all people.'

'We are capable of preventing all attempts to infiltrate armed groups and arms smugglers. This is why demilitarization is a major step in UNTAES's two-year mission whose ultimate aim is the peaceful reintegration of the region within the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia,' Arnold said.

Croatia: Vukovar Assembly Proposes 'Autonomous Status'

AU2305154496 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The commissioners of the Vukovar Municipal Assembly accepted the concept of a special status for the Srem-Baranja district. As they pointed out, there are historic, geographical, ethnic, and other predispositions for the recognition of this status. All this binds Croatia to grant autonomous status to the Serbs. Bogdan Rkman reports on the details from Vukovar:

[Begin recording] Within the framework of the special status, the district should be based on Western democratic principles, which include the right to elect the district assembly and the district government, as well as the same authorities at the municipal level. The special status would also contain the right to regional citizenship and passport, their own police, their own or any other appropriate currency, education, and jurisdiction. the Serbian language, anthem, flag, economic autonomy, etc.

According to the proposal, the district would be demilitarized, which means that no national service would be served. All inhabitants of the district who have lived there for at least 6 months would have the right to vote, and the same criterion would also apply for the acquisition of the regional citizenship.

The Croatian president would have the right to veto the documents issued by the district authorities in cases where they overstep their authority. For these demands to be realized, it is essential that the Croatian Sabor regulates the district's autonomy status with the passing of a special law.

The interests of the authorities would be represented by a special representative in the Croatian Sabor, and vice versa, the position of the Croatian Government would be articulated by a special envoy.

The Croatian prime minister would simultaneously preside over an expert team of which half of the members would be elected by the Croatian authorities and half by the district government. The recognition of the special status, according to the Vukovar councilors, would safeguard the current multiethnic and multiconfessional character of the district, as the only such district in Croatia. [end recording]

Croatia: Serb 'Executive Council' Criticizes Amnesty Law

AU2305174696 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 20 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic chaired the 5th session of the Executive Council of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Eastern Srem [as heard]. The session was attended by presidents of municipalities and municipal executive councils; Goran Hadzic, the president of the province, also attended part of the session. Here are the most important statements and decisions made at the session.

As was expected, the Croatian amnesty law, which the Croatian Parliament had adopted a day earlier, was considered at the beginning of the session, even though the topic had not been announced as a special item on the agenda. Taking part in the provincial government discussion on amnesty, President of the Province Goran Hadzic pointed out that the passing of the selective law on amnesty had no significant value regarding the people in the province. "As far as we are concerned, the law has not been passed," said Hadzic, explaining that a great number of citizens from the western part of the Krajina, to whom the law does not apply, are living in the province. Hadzic repeated the position that the government institutions represent the interest of all the

citizens living in the province, including Serbs, Croats, Hungarians, and others.

"The Croatian authorities have no right to adopt the abolition only for the Serbs who lived here until 1991," said Hadzic, emphasizing it is common knowledge that Croats and members of other ethnic groups took guns and took part in the events that started in 1991, together with the Serbs.

Vojin Susa, secretary of administration and justice, said that, in view of the fact that the amnesty law does not mention the citizens of the former Croatia who came to the province since 1991, it is contrary to the Erdut agreement.

The provincial government will put together a special (?report) advising administrator Klein of their disapproval and remarks regarding the amnesty law.

Apart from this topic, the provincial government also discussed the activity of the joint committees for the implementation of certain parts of the Erdut agreement, and analyzed the activity of the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] regarding retirement pensions.

It was decided that the subcommittees will not operate until further notice. Moreover, the possible consequences of the amnesty law were part of the discussion on the activity of joint subcommittees.

In view of the selective law, it was decided that the committees will not attend talks on the Croatian side, but carry them out at UNTAES bases at border crossings. If the Croatian side or UNTAES wish, these meetings may be held on the territory of the province as a sign of cooperation. This decision will be in force until a comprehensive amnesty law is passed.

The provincial government also considered the UNTAES activity aimed at facilitating the payment of retirement pensions in the area. Dr. Stanimirovic stated that the UNTAES is avoiding legal institutions in the attempt to register the old age pensioners, and that they had indicated that only the women would be included initially and that the men would be included a little later.

Apart from the fact that the disability pensions were not included in the plan, the essence of the problem is that the pensions would be paid only to pensioners who had acquired the right to the pensions in the former Croatia and whose permanent residence in 1991 was in the province. It was therefore concluded that the problems related to this issue be solved by joint committees at the level of the UNTAES committee in charge rather than only partially, by UNTAES (?on the ground).

As far as (?personal) nominations are concerned, Sr-bislav (?Mitic) was nominated provincial secretary for refugees and displaced persons, and assistants of certain secretaries were nominated on the basis of special decisions of the provincial government.

Particular attention was given to the power supply situation. In order for the power supply system capacity to be extended and a safer power supply future of the Serb province to be created, decisions were adopted that a new power supply balance and a new investment program be prepared. Moreover, it was decided that the necessary activity be carried out in order for a power utility to be (?founded) at the provincial level, and that a program be prepared for the reconstruction of the 400-kW power line and the 410/110 kW transformer station in Ernestinovo.

Croatia: Serbs Link Return of Croatian Refugees to Amnesty Law

LD2305184896 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1711 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Borovo, 25 May (TANJUG)—Representatives of the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem have not given their consent to the proposal to begin implementing the pilot program for the return of Croats to Bilje, Tenjski Antunovac, and Ernestinovo, and of Serbs to the western Slavonian village of Kusunje, Branko Jurisic, secretary for human rights and national minorities, said today.

"In fact, that was the Croatian side's proposal, which UNHCR representatives accepted. However, we have not given our consent," Jurisic explained, commenting on the news that it was agreed at a recent meeting of the mixed Serb-Croatian commission and UNHCR representatives to begin implementing this pilot program.

Jurisic stressed that the Serb side requested that certain villages near Okucani be included in the pilot program, in addition to Kusunje.

"There can be no serious program for the return of refugees until Croatia passes a law on general amnesty and thus puts Serb refugees from other areas in the same position as the Croats who would like to return to eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem," Jurisic stressed.

"According to information available to us, conditions for the return are ripe in the Pakrac area, too, but all this cannot happen before a general amnesty restores the Serbs' trust and gives them guarantees for the safety of their return," the Serb region's secretary for human rights and national minorities said in conclusion.

**Croatia: Russian Envoy Calls Amnesty Law
'Negative'**

*LD2305211596 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1940 GMT 23 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Erdut, May 23 (TANJUG)—Russia's special ambassador to the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem said on Thursday that Croatia's amnesty law for Serbs was full of negative elements.

Speaking to reporters after meeting with the Serb region's President Goran Hadzic, Ambassador Aleksandr (Aksenenok) said that the U.N. Transitional Authority in the region had the duty to intercede with the Croatian Government to amend the law.

The Croatian parliament has recently passed the law granting amnesty only to Serbs in the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem, with the exception of war criminals.

Serb deputies in the Croatian parliament asked at the time that the law be enlarged to apply to all areas whence Serbs have fled.

In a reaction to the wording of the law, the U.N. Security Council adopted a presidential statement on Wednesday [22 May] asking the government in Zagreb to declare general amnesty for all Serbs in former U.N. protected areas.

The Russian ambassador said that the process of the region's reintegration in Croatia could not be achieved unless the world community made parallel efforts to create condition for the safety of the population and protection of their property.

Asked about the level of autonomy possible for the region within Croatia, (Aksenenok) said that the matter must be dealt with in direct talks between the interested parties.

**Croatia: IFOR Sets Up Bridge Between Croatia,
Serb Bosnia**

*LD2305230296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 2200 GMT 23 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Bosnian Serbs cleared mines on the right bank of the River Sava, members of the Hungarian sappers' unit—part of the Implementation Force (IFOR)—this evening built a pontoon bridge across the River Sava between Slavonski Brod [in Croatia] and Bosanski Brod [in Serb part of Bosnia], which took about 20 minutes. The bridge was constructed 6 km southwest of Slavonski Brod, next to the so-called military barrier near the Croatian village of Migalovci. It is 260 meters long, seven meters wide, and can support a load of around 60 tonnes.

Poland: Interview With Polish President Kwasniewski*MS2305123296 Dublin THE IRISH TIMES in English 22 May 96 p 3*

[Report on interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by Fergus Pyle; from the THE IRISH TIMES supplement on Poland; place and date of interview not given]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the history of the world you have first a revolutionary stage and then you get to a stage where you get down and do the hard work. Aleksander Kwasniewski, a former communist minister and now Poland's president, has a robust answer when asked about his victory over Lech Walesa in the country's presidential election last November, six years after the overthrow of the communist regime.

Mr Walesa's defeat is still viewed with apprehension by many Poles who, though critical of the former president's erratic style, distrust the claims of the post-communists to have abandoned ideology in favour of pragmatism. Mr Kwasniewski has no difficulty in accepting the accusation of being technocratic made by his opponents, but says that this does not prevent him from having a vision of Poland's future.

"In 1989 we had what we call the bloodless revolution, luckily for us, and the big question nowadays is what you do with the victory. I believe that Polish accession to the European Union will be a revolutionary step. It takes a lot of hard work putting the puzzle pieces together—negotiating increases and terms of agreement, and so on.

"The picture that emerges from putting the pieces together may be of beauty in itself, but you need to put them in place one by one, day by day, week by week. In such a job you have very few romantic feelings and notions. Yes, we have a vision, but certainly we are technocrats and we are pragmatic in our approach. I think these words carry a positive value."

Mr Kwasniewski sees his role as a reconciling one-of drawing together the strands of Poland's recent history, both internally and in relations with the West and Russia. "If you want to know who is my very close colleague and friend, it is Felipe Gonzalez [the former socialist prime-minister of Spain]. He started more or less in the same situation of total change in his country, and he gave Spain a good position in the European Communities. Then he offered Spaniards—and this is my task in Poland—the way of reconciliation."

Joining the EU and becoming a member of Nato are the fundamental aims of Poland's foreign policy. In regard to Nato, and Russia's suspicions about the

organisation's expansion, Mr Kwasniewski says that the policy must be steadfast and patient "steadfast because the goal is clear-cut. For reasons of national security we need to be a member of Nato, because there is a vacuum today in Europe's security system.

"We need to talk and explain and talk informally to our neighbours to the east, including the Belorussians, the Ukrainians. Hence the character of my visit to Moscow in April to see President Yeltsin. We knew from the word go that we wouldn't reach an agreement on Poland's accession to Nato. But we believe there are many fields on which there is much scope for expansion of Polish-Russian relations. And this benefits not only Poland and Russia, but also Europe.

"I am very happy that the signals we were able to send out in Moscow were well understood in the West. But after a year or so we shall grow out of this mutual misunderstanding and reach a stage where we are engaging the other side in a dialogue. Normal dialogue as you would expect between two neighbours."

As for German fears about the impact of Nato enlargement on relations with Russia Mr Kwasniewski says that he has talked to Chancellor Helmut Kohl several times and found him to be a realist, supporting Poland's membership, but with a step-by-step approach: "It is a foregone conclusion that Poland will become a member of Nato, but we have to do it in such a way as not to antagonise Russia.

"This is the attitude we adopt. We don't want to be a front-line nation; we want to enjoy otherwise very proper and good relations with Russia, and not be seen as an enemy. This is the very chance I see as having been created by the revolution of 1989 in which confrontation in Europe between East and West is gone and the bipolar arrangement is replaced by a new security architecture in which there is no antagonism, but we can co-operate. That is the real new value in our lives."

During the presidential election, the Catholic church strongly supported Mr Walesa in the final stages, and Mr Kwasniewski admits he was not "the favourite among the bishops...but it is also true to say that among the 10 million people who cast their votes for me the decisive majority are Catholics. We should not continue to think about Polish Catholicism in terms of stereotypes."

His own view, which he claims was the same before he was elected, is that Poland is a Catholic country, and due regard needs to be paid to Polish tradition. "For normal social life, we need normal state/church relations. And that means the church having its autonomy, enjoying its religious freedom, but also that the lay side is allowed

to continue in its lay ways. I want to bring normality to the relationship."

The delay in ratifying the concordate, negotiated with the Vatican before the postcommunist government came to power at the end of 1993, is, he believes, "the tip of the iceberg" of "undercurrents, tensions, surrounding certain issues relating to church-state relations.

"It was a common perception, even among Catholics, that the church recently has adopted the attitude of the victorious church the church that broke down communism in eastern Europe. I think people, among other reasons, cast their votes for me to voice their apprehension about the Polish church getting, let's say, too big for its shoes. Some of these apprehensions are exaggerated, but they exist in the current social consciousness. Hence we try to clarify certain issues, a formula that would be acceptable to the parliament.

"There is another aspect to it. I believe that the church is also trying to draw conclusions from the events of the last years, and a certain change of attitude is already detectable. The church is no longer as much involved in current politics as it is in matters which are the natural domain of the church, such as family life, community life."

Poland: Recent Moscow Military Talks Analyzed
WS2405122596 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 23 May 96 p 7

[Article by Maria Wagrowska: "How To Cooperate With Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] For a long time now, in the sphere of Poland's foreign relations, there has not been an issue that outraged the opposition parties and public opinion as much as the visit by National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski to Moscow and the vague military cooperation agreements reached with his Russian counterpart, Pavel Grachev. Although quite a bit of time has already passed since the talks in the capital of the Russian Federation in early April, discussions among politicians, parliament members, political scientists, servicemen, and people interested in Poland's foreign relations have not ended.

What did the minister actually offer Russian politicians and military people? Will Poland and Russia form a mixed battalion and carry out joint maneuvers? If they do, what kind of ventures will these be? Will they remind us of the bad times, when the armed forces of the nonsovereign Poland were subordinated to the Soviet Army? Or do they stand a chance of becoming a symbol of partnership relations linking the Polish Republic, an independent, Western-oriented country, to

the new Russian Federation? Did the National Defense Ministry [MON] betray Polish interests by agreeing that our armed forces purchase Russian-made armaments, thus making our Army dependent on Moscow? Or did it accept only the most indispensable transactions, just to ensure supplies of spare parts needed in the utilization of Soviet-made equipment, primarily aircraft, which the Polish armed forces are to use until they purchase new armaments.

However, some people ask themselves another, general question: Should Poland discuss the European security system with Russia in view of the fact that this may be understood as holding consultations on the conditions of our country's joining NATO?

It does not look like the debate on Polish-Russian military cooperation will die down. It was triggered by media reports that quoted contradictory statements by the Polish and Russian ministers. In addition, we will probably see Stanislaw Dobrzanski being interviewed by the Sejm National Defense Committee.

Here is what RZECZPOSPOLITA reported on 4 April: "It cannot be ruled out that as early as this year Russian military units will come to Poland to take part in joint exercises with Polish soldiers..." According to our daily, these exercises took place this year on the territory of Poland and then in Russia. On the following day, GAZETA WYBORCZA announced that joint exercises of Polish and Russian subunits would be held this year as part of the Partnership for Peace program on the training grounds of the Leningrad Military District and in Ukraine during the maneuvers of several countries—the United States, among others.

According to RZECZPOSPOLITA, Stanislaw Dobrzanski proposed establishing a joint Polish-Russian battalion of peacekeeping forces with soldiers of the Kaliningrad Special Defense Region. The battalion might take part in UN peacekeeping missions, but not in Bosnia. POLSKA ZBROJNA added that the Polish side would be represented by the Warsaw Military District. GAZETA WYBORCZA confined itself to reporting that the Polish minister had proposed establishing a Polish-Russian battalion to carry out UN peacekeeping missions. Moreover, Dobrzanski reportedly spoke about broadening military cooperation in the area of technology. Moscow correspondents of the Polish press quoted Minister Grachev and reported that the head of the Polish MON was interested in obtaining spare parts for the Su-22, MiG-29, and MiG-21 combat aircraft. GAZETA WYBORCZA added that Dobrzanski proposed establishing Polish-Russian overhaul and production joint ventures.

Declarations Versus Reality

Because of lack of information from sources other than the press—and even press reports varied a lot—many politicians decided that the Dobrzanski visit to Moscow was rather controversial. Leaders of the Freedom Union [UW], Leszek Balcerowicz and Bronislaw Geremek, expressed fears that the entire situation might have given the impression that "there is a discrepancy between the declarations of the present coalition regarding our integration with NATO and the real actions being taken by the government." Piotr Naimski stressed on behalf of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP] that Poland must have good relations with Russia, but this should not mean that we should become dependent on it. ROP demanded a public report on the Moscow talks. Conservative Coalition leader Kazimierz Ujazdowski went as far as to demand Dobrzanski's resignation.

When the MON head returned from Moscow, no one received his explanations as satisfactory. For this reason, UW, the biggest opposition party in parliament, would like to make Minister Dobrzanski present his explanations once again in front of deputies of the Sejm National Defense Commission. However, UW wants to avoid a "political battle" over this issue, RZECZPOSPOLITA was told by Bronislaw Komorowski, a member of the National Defense Commission and former deputy national defense minister responsible for contacts with foreign countries. According to our interlocutor, it is the presidium of the National Defense Commission that is the organ that should demand explanations from the minister. Despite the composition of the commission, where deputies of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party constitute a majority, and despite the fact that it is chaired by an SLD member (Jerzy Szmajdzinski), there is a chance to do this.

"In the case of Minister Dobrzanski, who had a rather difficult task to carry out in Moscow, the principle of limited trust should be applied; however, it should certainly be trust," Komorowski told us. "Things went so far that, during the Moscow visit, we received really bad signals; signals that came from the Russian side differed from those that came from the Polish side. Minister Pavel Grachev, and, more importantly, Boris Yeltsin, on numerous occasions quoted the alleged Polish-Russian agreement. Thus, it looks like the Russian side persists in thinking that some agreement was reached." [passage omitted]

The Facts

RZECZPOSPOLITA tried to elucidate the doubts and controversies caused by Stanislaw Dobrzanski's visit to

Moscow. Below we are presenting the facts we have managed to determine:

—During the meeting, no written agreement was reached regarding exercises or formation of a battalion.

—"Brave Eagle" exercises are to be held in our country in July 1997, with the participation of a Russian as well as an American subunit. These exercises will be part of the Partnership for Peace program.

—Minister Dobrzanski stressed that he attached great importance to cooperation among military subunits from various countries in UN peacekeeping missions, including exercises of Polish and Russian subunits on the territories of both states. Command and staff exercises programs, he said, might be agreed upon beforehand. This would make for joint operations within the same battalion. He argued that the participation of Russia, Ukraine, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States in such exercises should improve security in our region.

—Poland offered to train Russian officers in Polish academies; it also proposed that Polish officers continue their education in Russian academies (the novelty here is that Russia has recalled its officers from Polish academies, whereas our officers are still acquiring knowledge at the Frunze Academy in Moscow).

—The talks also dealt with the possibility of developing border-area cooperation between Poland and Kaliningrad Oblast. Poland suggested that it might supply this region with agricultural produce and foodstuffs. We would export food to Russia and receive Russian spare parts for our military hardware; however, our minister stressed that our food supplies would have to be made in line with the principles of a free-market economy. Minister Grachev claimed that the great concentration of Russian troops in the Kaliningrad area is not aimed against Poland. He hinted that he meant the Federal Republic of Germany.

—The ministers discussed scientific and technological cooperation, including our plans to purchase some armaments as well as projects that envision overhaul of aircraft engines and Russian ships manufactured in Polish shipyards. The discussion also included modernization of some military hardware and the establishment of joint ventures for that purpose. According to one of RZECZPOSPOLITA's interlocutors, this would mean considerable facilitations because Poland would not have to carry out scientific research; it might only modernize its military hardware by taking advantage of what has already been developed in Russia. An interesting thing is that our interlocutors linked to state institutions preferred to ignore the topic of joint ventures that would

be established in industry. They confined themselves to saying that we would need technological cooperation with Russia as long as we had Russian-made hardware (which constitutes at least 80 percent of our armaments). They disagreed with the suggestion that, as a result of cooperation with Russia, the lifespan of the hardware would be extended. They pointed out that, in the case of all kinds of equipment, their lifespan is specified. Some types of Russian armaments have already ceased functioning. In line with their estimates, the aviation equipment used by Poland will be used up in the years 2000-05.

Zdzislaw Czekierda, spokesman of the General Staff of the Polish armed forces, told us, after consulting with representatives of the Department of Armaments and Military Equipment Supply, that the agreement reached by Ministers Buchacz and Davydov protects Polish interests very well. He added, however, that, during the negotiations, the Polish side managed to talk the Russians out of "certain things."

—The Russian defense minister spoke favorably of the Polish proposals regarding development of military cooperation. He said that never before had he received from our country such large-scale proposals as those submitted by Minister Dobrzanski. He added that Russia does not oppose Poland's cooperation with NATO within the Partnership for Peace program; however, it does not want to see the military structures of the alliance drawing closer to its Western borders.

Poland: Defense Minister on Military Exercises With Russia

WS2405110496 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 23 May 96 p 7

[Interview with Polish Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski by Maria Wagrowska; place and date not given: "A Battalion Equals Exercise"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Wagrowska] Do you admit the possibility of holding bilateral military exercises with Russia, on Polish territory at that?

[Dobrzanski] Multilateral military exercises are to be held in Poland next year within the Partnership for Peace program, of which Russia is a cosignatory. I see Partnership for Peace as a model project that allows the development of friendly relations with other states, enhances military cooperation, and promotes peace. That is why Poland will take part in military exercises within its framework with NATO members, neutral states, and others. I therefore invited Russia to exercises in July. Multilateral exercises are to be held in June in Ukraine, and Russia is to take part.

We still have to talk about the bilateral Polish-Russian exercises. A group of experts is to be established soon to discuss the issue. We might come to the conclusion that the exercises should be trilateral.

I do not see any obstacles to cooperation as long as it takes place within the framework of Partnership for Peace. Military cooperation between Poland and Russia is provided for in the strategy of NATO. Moreover, despite the uproar after my visit to Moscow, soon followed by the president's visit, Poland's Eastern policy has been gaining recognition in the West.

[Wagrowska] Do you not fear adverse reactions from society and the political opposition if bilateral exercises with fully armed Russian forces are held on Polish territory?

[Dobrzanski] Exercises with complete subunits from foreign countries are highly improbable. They are rarely carried out because there is neither the need nor the money. It is sufficient to train a soldier on the level of the platoon or company in his own country. It does not make sense to form multinational platoons or teams. The smallest unit that does make sense is a battalion or a brigade. Battalions and brigades, however, imply the necessity of exercises at a proper level; not for soldiers, but for commanders who have to know how to work together using not weapons, but maps, pencils, and computers. Only staff exercises are carried out with foreign armies. Such exercises were recently held in Drawsko, with the participation of Polish, German, and Danish officers.

[Wagrowska] It is interesting that you are using only pragmatic and technocratic arguments. You are being criticized, however, for political reasons...

[Dobrzanski] I would rather call them emotional.

[Wagrowska] Does that not pose a huge dilemma for you?

[Dobrzanski] I wonder whether I should not yield a part of my pragmatism in order to gain credibility in the eyes of the public, to demonstrate that I do not want to do anything foolish. In view of the history of the past several decades and the emotions that contacts with Russia raise in our society, I hardly find the fears surprising. I do like, however, to be seen as a pragmatist.

Exercises should be held with every country that has its troops in peacekeeping forces. Poles and Russians might find themselves in adjoining sectors in the operation zone. Unless we train and learn how to communicate, not only the effectiveness of operations but also the life of our men can be jeopardized. We have to approach this issue pragmatically.

[Wagrowska] Does that mean you will not abandon your projects?

[Dobrzanski] Naturally, I will not.

[Wagrowska] It is rumored that you did not even say the word "battalion" in Moscow. Is that true?

[Dobrzanski] But I did say it. All Grachev and I had in mind were the exercises. Only here it was said that Dobrzanski wants to select barracks on—God forbid!—the Polish side and then mobilize Russian and Polish soldiers and deploy them mainly on our territory. A joint battalion does not exist as long as we carry out exercises. It could be established only after the governments decided that somewhere in Bosnia, for example (for political or social reasons or because of the very nature of the battalion), a Polish-Russian battalion should be deployed. This could be possible only in response to a request from the UN or NATO if it approached the Polish and Russian Governments saying: "Your men are prepared for the job, send your battalion there." Only if the two governments agreed could the trained commanders and their soldiers form a joint battalion. By way of preparation, companies or platoons would be formed from selected subunits or units and told: "You will form a battalion for special purposes. For the time being, you will only train: draw maps, simulate various situations, learn how to cooperate, select the type of weaponry you would need in specific situations." This is what the exercising game is about.

[Wagrowska] This means that a joint battalion with Russia would not be taboo to you?

[Dobrzanski] No, it would not. Please remember that, when you say "battalion," you have to think "exercise." After all, neither Grachev nor I has the authority to decide to establish a battalion. We can only hold joint exercises.

[Wagrowska] Did the Russians take you up on the offer over the couple of weeks that have elapsed since your visit to Moscow, or is the decision to establish a group of experts the last development?

[Dobrzanski] No steps have been taken yet.

Poland: Official Views State Security Policy
WS2405120396 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 20 May 96 p 4

[Article by Jerzy J. Milewski, under secretary of state in the Presidential Chancellery and chief of the National Security Office: "Should We Have an Independent Security Policy?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The question posed in the title might be treated as rhetorical if it were not for the

fact that, regardless of any verbal declarations, such doubts appear quite often during various discussions and presentations of positions regarding the issue of security. Before presenting a few reflections on this topic, I would like to recall the idea of state security that is used in "The Principles of the Polish Security Policy": The modern content of the idea of state security includes political and military issues, as well as economic, environmental, social, and ethnic ones. It seems that the cited formulation aptly denotes the complexity of problems in the concept of security presented in this article.

About Security Policy in Its International Aspect

Sometimes I have the impression that for some people Poland's accession to NATO is an ultimate goal and the end of our thinking about national security. I hope I do not need here to recall my years-old conviction that we must belong to the North Atlantic alliance. However, I cannot but criticize those perceiving the alliance as a sort of perfectly outfitted fortress, in which all issues of our national security will be settled without any further effort on our part. The alliance is a dynamic system, subject to creative transformation (which constitutes its strength and attraction), and its membership does not revoke, but implies the political identity of each member state. On the one hand, we have to accept limitations on the autonomous use of troops in connection with NATO membership, but, on the other, we must remember that NATO membership implies and postulates both political activity in the international arena and considerable flexibility in determining and implementing the security policy of one's own country. A good example in this regard is the political process in making the recent decision to send military troops of some NATO countries to Bosnia. Thus, Poland, as a future NATO member, will have to make a permanent creative contribution to the formation of a joint European—or, rather, euro-atlantic—security policy. One should expect that, because of the geopolitical conditions of our state and its experiences from the distant and recent past, our country's contribution in this sphere will perhaps be more significant than our real participation in the allied armed forces.

It would also be erroneous to believe that, after joining NATO, the European Union [EU], and the Western European Union, our relations with other states, particularly our neighbors, will be only a function of the common policy of these organizations. On the contrary, in a unified Europe regional interests will assert themselves more strongly than national ones. Even today we can feel the existence of regional pressure groups (for instance, the Scandinavian lobby or that of Mediterranean countries). Along with the expansion of euro-atlantic

institutions eastward, there will undoubtedly appear a strong Central European lobby, which, for example, will give priority to cooperation with Germany. It is also necessary to remember the EU's principle of subsidiarity, according to which problems should be resolved at the lowest possible level. Of course, this implies great activity of the member states on the level of bilateral or regional relations. We must adapt ourselves to these new phenomena and demands.

Do Our Armed Forces Push Us Away From NATO or Bring Us Closer to It?

I would not like to participate in a debate on this topic. I believe that the very appearance of this question in the context of our security policy is an alarming signal. I realize that the Polish Army must be rearmed with new weaponry and modern equipment, close in its standards to those used by NATO countries. The Polish Army must adapt itself to NATO standards of command, master the English language, and so forth. It must also make its organizational structure more flexible and achieve a higher level of mobility. All of this requires time and money, but it is not only a political problem. A much more important problem for the Armed Forces is to intentionally give up its role in the political life. I do not treat the opinions presented here as a personal skirmish with generals. In my opinion, the Army as a whole, as a structure, is still bearing the stigma of the former political system in which, even if independently of its will, the Army was an element of the political system. I want to be understood properly: I am not speaking about the political involvement of soldiers and officers, but about the place of the Armed Forces in the social structure of the state. An undisputable axiom was that it was the Army that had restored independence and defended the people. Consequently, it was the Army that determined the volume of expenditures for the defense system. The servicemen also decided the structure and numerical strength of the Army. The defense budget was shrouded in mystery and this, given the then circumstances, was deemed normal. The Army not only ensured security, but also was able to help in harvesting and constructing roads and bridges. In this way, relations between the Armed Forces and society were obviously deepened, but, at the same time, they increased their role as an independent subject in the political life of the state.

Today, the Army does not "defend socialism like independence," neither does it construct roads and bridges or help in harvesting. There is no money or time for this, but the high command personnel are still convicted of its exceptional role. The point is not in a sort of servicemen's ethos (let there be as

much of this ethos as possible), but in a mixture of functions performed by the Army in the times of the Warsaw Pact with some elements of the Polish tradition and religiousness dating back to the pre-World War II period or even to the period before Poland's partitions [in the 18th century]. It is decidedly a curious conglomerate whose existence is furthered, I think, by the helplessness of a significant portion of our political elites in matters concerning the Army and defense. Due to the fact that during the years of the communist rule this topic was addressed only in speeches and manifestos full of slogans and incantations, we are generally lacking in both knowledge and willingness to deal with it. Regardless of party colors, a mistaken conviction prevails that national defense matters belong primarily to the servicemen. The abnormality of this situation becomes more evident when compared to convictions of the elites and public outlooks regarding matters of internal security. Nobody assigns a political role to the police. Nobody doubts that this sphere must be in charge of politicians. Prime ministers and ministers give these issues higher and higher priority in their program addresses. The police and other services subordinated to the interior minister are treated not as a force creating the security policy, but also as tools for implementing this policy. It is enough to recall the resolute rejection—on the part of all political forces—of any attempts (even those alleged) to implicate the special services in political games. As for the Army, its role is still being perceived in a different manner.

The Place and Role of the Army in Political Life

While posing the question whether, due to our Army, we are closer or further away from NATO, I have in mind precisely these matters. I do not ignore the issue of armament and equipment, although in this matter, too, we are burdened with the aforementioned ideology of the Armed Forces as a national defender, which does not allow us to use more rationally funds of a state that is just recovering from the economic crisis. We do not match NATO standards only in the quality of our Army's weapons or its training level. I believe that a greater danger is in the difference of perceiving the place and role of armed forces in the political life of a state. I repeat once again: I am not concerned with personal issues. However, I cannot but say straightforwardly that political forces have not so far been able to take an unambiguous stand, as well as all disciplinary measures, with regard to the generals who during the infamous dinner at Drawsko actually refused obedience to their civilian leadership. I do not think that we will see a repetition of such blameworthy behavior in the near future. I know, however, that in the international arena the above-mentioned event is presented as an ex-

ample of our unreadiness to join NATO. Also, I cannot but mention the fact that there were no official measures taken against generals who publicly reprimanded civilian politicians for allocating insufficient funds for the Army. The situation was like that of trade union strike committees demanding that the employer comply with their wage demands. I could also ask why the necessary and legislatively stipulated transformation of the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff into a single, integrated office has been, for several years, a topic for discussion exclusively in ministerial commissions. There are other similar questions, and I am afraid that the silence of the political class does more damage to our country's defense sphere than the trends toward autonomy characterizing a certain part of the military.

The aspects of the idea of security cited in the beginning could determine further stages of the reflections that were inaugurated in this article. While avoiding simplified conclusions, it is possible even now to state that Poland's postulated access to the euro-atlantic security structures will increase expectations and postulates regarding our political participation in the international arena. It is also obvious that this will require—starting right now—a domestic policy coordinated with our participation in the international forum. I have the impression that we still have a lot to do in the latter sphere.

Poland: Military Secret Services Chief Interviewed
WS2305121596 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA
in Polish 20 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Commodore Kazimierz Glowacki, chief of the Polish Military Intelligence Service, by Janusz B. Grochowski; place and date not given: "The Secret Services Do Not Like Publicity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Grochowski] Is Poland threatened by infiltration by foreign intelligence services?

[Glowacki] That is a very difficult question. Unequivocal judgments are best avoided.

[Grochowski] A secret...?

[Glowacki] Not only that. If I told you today that everything is all right and tomorrow we are forced to shed light on the operations of foreign intelligence agents, we would look ridiculous. Let us tackle this subject differently. Our current geopolitical situation gives us a sense of security. Despite the lack of any imminent threat, we do observe certain undercurrents that might endanger our interests in the future. We are very well aware that we can become a territory for foreign intelligence operations because we are a tasty morsel. We cannot allow ourselves to be taken by

surprise. We were established to follow what is going on in our country and on its borders.

[Grochowski] The Czechs claim that foreign intelligence services are trying to interfere with their internal affairs. They believe similar threats exist in other states of Central and East Europe, Poland included.

[Glowacki] Poland is not the site of intelligence maneuvers at the moment, although several states would find that desirable. Unfortunately, I have to admit that the political situation of our country—suspended in the "gray zone" between East and West—at a time when we are knocking on NATO's door, provokes penetration of our territory. Secret services are to register and neutralize such activity. This is not a problem we politicians or the government can deal with alone. Wide social support is necessary.

[Grochowski] I do not know whether the three espionage trials we have witnessed in the Third Republic of Poland are an indication of Polish counterintelligence's weakness or the inertia of foreign services.

[Glowacki] They have primarily shown that we are prepared to ward off danger, regardless of the direction it comes from. The number of espionage cases cannot be used as a yardstick to measure the effectiveness of the counterintelligence services. Effectivity is the ability to exert full control over intelligence penetration of the country, drawing proper operational conclusions and sharing them with politicians so that they can make proper decisions. I can assure you that is exactly what we are doing.

[Grochowski] Every secret service has its sources. Once in a while, however, projects creating a very real threat for these people appear. Do you not fear that they might stop cooperating with you?

[Glowacki] I trust that rationality and the self-preservation instinct will prevail. Information passed on to us enhances state security. People must be convinced that not only a bandit with a crowbar poses a threat, but also overly inquisitive individuals who collect seemingly insignificant information.

[Grochowski] You should first convince the politicians who have created an aura of distrust around the secret services.

[Glowacki] I do not think they have any major objections to our activities. They can be critical of the past, when the secret services—the military included—were drawn into politics. One problem still remains: the lack of proper information channels, which often results in false assessments and biased interpretations. We will talk with the politicians, mainly at the forum of the

Sejm Secret Services Commission. We will humbly accept any criticism we deserve and draw the proper conclusions.

[Grochowski] Jerzy Jaskiernia, the former justice minister, approached the Constitutional Tribunal with a query about whether the Military Information Services [WSI] have the right to use the same operational techniques as the Office of State Protection [UOP]. The answer was negative.

[Glowacki] A mistake was made in the interpretation of the consequences of the tribunal's ruling. The authors of the "police" laws wanted to entrust intelligence and counterintelligence services subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense with exactly the same authority, operational techniques, and tasks as UOP, albeit in the field of protecting state defense. The verdict of the tribunal confirmed WSI rights to use the same operational techniques. One exception, however, was made. Our institution, a purely operational service not a "police service," cannot apply the new techniques that UOP and the police have been authorized to use—for example, sting operations. I do not see this as a reason for despair.

[Grochowski] You speak as if there was no rivalry between the WSI and UOP.

[Glowacki] I very strongly oppose any rivalry. I believe the media have been projecting a false picture. It is more entertaining to read about the WSI as UOP's more handsome brother or the other way around. For me, however—and I wish to emphasize this very strongly—the division of operational territory is very important, and we do not want to tread on anyone else's ground. The WSI territory is MON and the arms industry. We implement tasks that the Sejm, the government, and the defense minister assign us.

[Grochowski] But a controversy arose as to who is to supervise the arms industry.

[Glowacki] You are right, although I would not overestimate the significance of the conflict. Unfortunately, it was caused by a misinterpretation of regulations by people who did not study the law thoroughly enough. The division of competences carried out by [former] Prime Minister Pawlak has dispelled all doubts, and today there is no conflict. An agreement has settled the issue for good. The WSI and UOP are to cooperate and not rival each other.

We are responsible for counterintelligence protection of companies and scientific research institutions established by the defense minister and working for the needs of the Armed Forces. We not only try to prevent the disclosure of state secrets, but also see to it that proce-

dures provided for in international military cooperation are observed, including the exchange of new technologies and weaponry. This necessitates that we cooperate not only with UOP, but also with agencies of the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation.

[Grochowski] One of the preconditions for the survival of the domestic arms industry is broadening cooperation with foreign companies. This might create problems in the field of protecting secrets.

[Glowacki] Indeed, especially in the initial phase of transformation, the opening up posed many problems. Some arms manufacturers did not keep a reasonable distance from foreign partners and were incapable of meeting obvious cooperation requirements in protecting not only their own interests, but also the defense and economic interests of the state. One example is the widely publicized case of the Proxy consulting firm or the "rifle" affair.

[Grochowski] Did the arms industry learn anything from those bitter lessons?

[Glowacki] Perhaps not everyone, but for some time now we have been observing a growing willingness on the part of managers in the arms industry to cooperate with us. They are more inclined to follow our advice on how to protect their secrets; they ask us to check the credibility of potential partners who want to enter science and technology, manufacturing, or trade cooperation with them. So far there have been no complaints about the services we render. The best proof is the fact that Polish-produced weapons did not make their way to countries in which there is an international embargo on exports of special equipment.

[Grochowski] A draft law on the WSI has been under preparation for a year now. Let us hope it will finally settle all ambiguities.

[Glowacki] I am for a simple and clear law. It is easy to lose your way, and the division of competences becomes unclear in a labyrinth of provisions. This can generate conflict if anyone decides to freely interpret the spirit and letter of the law. I have no doubt whatsoever that the law has to guarantee effective parliamentary control over military intelligence and counterintelligence. It should also enable the defense minister to assign tasks. On the other hand, it should not overly interfere with the details of our operations, not make it difficult for us to implement the tasks we are assigned. An overgrown bureaucracy can delay the exchange of information and, as a consequence, paralyze the process of warding off threats.

Romania: Roman Refutes Russian Objections to NATO Expansion*AU2405101396 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 20 May 96 p 15*

[Interview with Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party, by Florin Condurately in Athens on 19 May: "Petre Roman: 'The More Brutal Russia's Position and the Firmer Our Stance, the More Likely It Is That We Will Join NATO'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Condurately] Mr. Petre Roman, what brought you to Athens?

[Roman] Last Saturday, the Political Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly [NAA] conducted the main debate on NATO's expansion. I am very happy that my report was the main attraction, so to say, of the debate, because it presented the viewpoint of the Central and Eastern European countries, something that is of interest to the NATO allies. Of course, I composed the report in such a way that it can also be considered a plea in Romania's favor. This debate was very important, because I was actually involved in an argument with a large and representative Russian delegation. The Russians are categorically opposed to the admittance of countries from Eastern and Central Europe to NATO. A certain gentleman, a member of Russia's Presidential Council, made a speech that intimated that our countries might need Russia's approval to join NATO. This was the meaning of their intervention.

[Condurately] Do you mean to say that even Poland, Czechia, and Hungary need Russia's approval to join NATO?

[Roman] Everyone.

[Condurately] What was the audience's reaction?

[Roman] The reaction was as follows: After the Russian representative Karaganov spoke, Mr. Gerald Solomon, the president of the Political Committee, gave me the floor and I clarified matters, by attesting to the fact that, when I was prime minister and participated in the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, in Prague, June 1991, there was no discussion about certain restrictions to be imposed upon the countries that belonged to the Warsaw Pact.

[Condurately] Therefore, when the Warsaw Treaty dissolved, the Russians did not raise objections to the possible NATO adherence of the countries from the former communist camp?

[Roman] The Russians claim there was some arrangement to this effect, but then the matter should have been discussed at the time when the Pact was dissolved. I was there at the time and there was no talk about such an in-

terdiction. I said that in Athens. Of course, Karaganov was very quiet on this subject. Afterward, he tried to counter my statements by referring to Romania's treaty with the Soviet Union, a treaty signed by Ion Iliescu. Here, Karaganov again tried to be very shrewd. But I reminded him that this treaty, was not ratified—at my urging—by Romania's Parliament. I also told him another thing: It so happens that, in certain respects, the Parliament of the Soviet Union proved more flexible than the present Duma, because the Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution on the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact being null and void, while the Duma considers the dissolution of the Soviet Union to be illegal. I say: Here are two opposite views, which make us wonder. Of course, I dwelt a lot on their thesis that Russia has a strategic interest in keeping a military base in Dniester. Here, I recalled the arrogance of the former Russian foreign minister. At the time, I told Mr. Kozyrev that the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, a sovereign and independent state, clearly stipulates that no foreign military bases are to be accepted on the national territory of Moldova. To which, Kozyrev told me: "OK, we will have the Constitution changed." My words had a strong impact in Athens. Then, Gerald Solomon said in this respect: "We will have a full debate on this after Mr. Roman presents his report." This is indeed what happened. After I presented my report—which enjoyed a very great success, since it was met with open applause by the audience—there was a whole debate on this point, with representatives from any Western, Central, and Eastern European countries taking the floor. The three Russian deputies present also participated in the discussion, in an obstructionist way.

[Condurately] How did they try to obstruct the discussions?

[Roman] They said: "Well, but how do you intend to convince Russia that NATO's expansion is not hostile to Russia?" In the end, after presenting several arguments along these lines, which can also be found in my report, I told them: "Gentlemen, if the side that wants to convince the other side does not seem convincing enough, it is not always its own fault." I was referring to their stubborn attitude vis-a-vis my statement that it is much better for Russia if its longtime enemy finally comes to them as a friend. Why should Russia still consider NATO as a hostile force? Finally, a rather heated debate ensued, with many congratulations being extended to me afterward by my colleagues, both from the NATO alliance and from other countries.

[Condurately] Was any decision made in Athens?

[Roman] Decisions are not made at the spring session. My report—completed, revised, and adjusted—will be

submitted to the fall session next November, before the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council in December, and will be adopted then. However, my report has already been taken up by Mr. Solana, NATO secretary general, who told me, through his aide who visited Bucharest, that he finds this report very useful.

[Condurately] Mr. Petre Roman, do you believe that there is a more favorable wind for Romania's joining NATO?

[Roman] I believe that if NATO adopts the viewpoint favoring an expansion that includes more than two countries, then Romania has chances of joining NATO, particularly if the fall elections lead to a more democratic majority, and certainly a more democratic-liberal one, in the philosophical sense of the word. Then, I believe that Romania has a chance of belonging to the group of countries that will join NATO.

[Condurately] Therefore, do you believe that Romania may join NATO even in the first batch of countries to be admitted?

[Roman] Yes, if the decision is taken that NATO should expand by admitting more than two countries.

[Condurately] Which two countries have preferential treatment?

[Roman] Poland and the Czech Republic—there seems to be a common understanding in this respect. However, the more brutal Russia's opposition and the stronger our desire to join NATO becomes, the more likely it is that NATO's expansion will extend to more than five countries. We must be firm, clear, and untiringly active.

[Condurately] Are there any meetings before the fall where Romania can make further pleas for its admittance to NATO?

[Roman] There are several technical stages that must also be covered—I am talking about the stages of this individualized and intensified dialogue. Questions were raised in Athens, too, about our internal democracy, the independent television, the independent press, and the minorities.

[Condurately] What answers did you give to these questions?

[Roman] It is quite simple, really. I believe that nobody in Romania can say that there is no independent press. Regarding independent television, there are problems with the public television, but fortunately we have a lot of private television stations, hence there is an independent television, too. Regarding the minorities, I used a very simple expression. I said that I believe that everybody realizes that the matter of the minorities was more a political issue, rather than a real problem.

[Condurately] Although no votes were cast at the Athens meeting, did you at least notice a favorable attitude for Romania in the eyes of the participants?

[Roman] I did not have to notice anything, since I was directly told so by my colleagues, including by President Carsten Vogt, who said that the report was very useful and that much has been gained in clarifying the position of the Central and Eastern European countries, Romania included, regarding adherence to NATO.

Romania: SRI Director Denies Involvement in Wiretapping

AU2305131196 Bucharest *EVENIMENTUL ZILEI* in Romanian 16 May 96 p 3

[Report by Andra Manta: "SRI Captain Constantin Bucur Was Suspended From Office—Colonel Zamfir, Head of the Special Unit 'T' Said That 'The Entire Scandal Is a Fabrication'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The commission in charge of control over the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] activity began hearings yesterday, 15 May, in the case of the scandal of Captain Bucur's cassettes, which contained the so-called illegal recordings made by the SRI. Virgil Magureanu [SRI director] categorically denied any SRI involvement in this case. He announced that Bucur Constantin was released from office because he took away cassettes from the SRI.

Virgil Magureanu Is Calling on All SRI Officers

Having spoken to the SRI control commission yesterday, Virgil Magureanu told the press the following:

"I suspect that the public is aware of the scandal through which, unwillingly, we have become the subject of the public's attention. We would have preferred to become the subject of the public's attention owing to some achievements of the institution and not some failure. I am aware of the seriousness of what has happened, but I beg you not to ask me to discuss the genuineness of it or to what extent our institution can assume responsibility for the recordings that we have been accused of at the Greater Romania Party [PRM] news conference. We will not express our views on this issue, first of all because we are the accused party and the investigation has barely started, but I assure you that the investigation proceedings will be much shorter and the answers regarding that illegal wiretapping, those who initiated them, and those who were the subjects of this 'attention,' which violates the national security law, will be very clear.

"However, I am going to talk about it, since I am aware of the seriousness of the situation from another point of

view, namely the seriousness of a great responsibility, if not the greatest responsibility, incumbent personally on me. I am talking about a certain SRI employee—I am referring to Captain Bucur Constantin—who, for reasons of which I am not yet really aware, let himself be recruited and did some services. We do not expressly doubt the good faith of those who worked in this way on him; however, I draw attention to the responsibility incumbent on us as an institution to protect our institution from the possibility that an active employee of the secret service with a military character can be dragged into actions incompatible with the SRI's statute. I believe that from this standpoint his action was illegal, regardless of his reasons for it or his political beliefs.

"We think that this occurrence should be a lesson for us all and I take this opportunity to call not only on the Romanian public but also on all SRI employees: If they have any complaints that might be justified within the limits of the military regulations and irrespective of whether they are or are not in accordance with the law, they should not voice their complaints by appealing to certain political parties.

"We believe that through such actions they act against the law and against the statute of military personnel in the SRI or in any other military institution. In the system of democratic regulations of a rule-of-law state, there are enough bodies that one can turn to with a complaint. First of all, they can turn to the commission in charge of the SRI activity control, directly to the parliament, or, according to hierarchy, to their commanders, rather than go and sell their political beliefs over the counter to the detriment of the institution and for the benefit of one group or another that does not have the well-being of the institution at heart."

"We Cannot Assume Responsibility for Any of the Recordings"

Commenting on the remarks of the SRI spokesman, Nicolae Ulieru, according to whom some of the conversations on Captain Bucur's cassettes are made by SRI and are legal, Virgil Magureanu said: "I believe that Mr. Ulieru exaggerated or did not pay attention to what he was saying. We cannot assume responsibility at this point for any of the recordings, for the context in which they had been made or the place where they had been made. The experts have not spoken yet. We cannot assume responsibility for some illegal recordings"—that was also what Ulieru said at the beginning, but later he seemed to have forgotten it.

However, Vasile Vacaru, head of the SRI commission, said that the SRI director "did not clearly say that the institution had not made the recordings, but said that if

recordings were made at the SRI, they are legal and have the approval of the General Prosecuting Magistracy."

"The General Prosecuting Magistracy will carry out the investigation shortly" said the SRI director. "If it is proved that the SRI is guilty, I am the major guilty person. I will bear all the consequences, including handing in my resignation. Between myself and the institution, if it is proved that one of the accusations is true, I am the one who is guilty. Only I can be blamed."

Asked by EVENIMENTUL ZILEI if he had met with President Iliescu and, if so, if the subject of the discussion had been Captain Bucur's cassettes, Virgil Magureanu said: "Certainly, I often have meetings with the president, every time I am called to see him. And probably I am going to be called to discuss this subject, too. In any event, I informed the president about everything that has taken place."

Asked about Ion Iliescu's reaction when he heard the respective news, the SRI director said: "The president asked me to act according to the law and to accept responsibilities according to the law for what has happened.

"Captain Bucur, through his attitude, has alone placed himself outside the institution and this is why he was removed from the ranks of the SRI."

The Commander of Division "T" Is Not Involved

Virgil Magureanu said that Colonel Zamfir, head of the special unit "T," who was heard yesterday by the SRI Commission, is not involved in this case. "Zamfir does not permit himself to do such things," said the SRI director clearly.

"I thank Radu Timpopste, the Party of Social Democracy of Romania [PDSR] senator, for never missing the opportunity to label us, the SRI, guilty when the issue refers to the institution in one way or another. Every time he gets involved, it is with the clear intention to find us guilty of something. Too often, using the fact that he is the head of the Senate's defense commission, he interferes in affairs that are none of his business according to the law and he was also unfair toward the SRI in jumping to conclusions this time: "I am convinced that he made some false remarks."

Col. Zamfir, head of the special unit "T," said that he did not give orders to the captain to record such conversations. He also stated that this scandal is all a "fabrication," as the taping could have been done by anybody.

The Cassettes Presented by C.V. Tudor "Are a PRM Fabrication"

As a result of the hearings yesterday in the SRI Commission, Vice President Nicolae Ionescu Galbeni, a National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party deputy, accompanied by three other members of this body—deputy Ilie Nica [PDSR], Gheorghe Corum [Civic Alliance Party], and Senator Karoly Szabo [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania]—paid a surprise visit to the special unit in the rooms where the SRI intercepts telephone conversations.

The members of the SRI commission verified the log book of intercepted telephone conversations, as well as

the record of orders sent by the General Prosecuting Magistracy on listening in to telephone conversations.

Sources from this subcommission told us that none of the telephone numbers indicated by Captain Bucur was subject to wiretapping by the SRI.

"It is becoming quite clear that the documentary material found on those cassettes by that alleged seeker of justice C.V. Tudor [president of the Greater Romania Party—PRM] is exclusively a PRM fabrication, made through his own information structures and that the SRI has nothing to do with it," members of this subcommission told us.

Slovenia: Drnovsek Favors Extending IFOR in Bosnia

BR2305144396 Brussels LE SOIR in French
23 May 96 p 2

[Interview with Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Edouard Van Velthem; place and date not given: "Slovenia, Its Dispute With Italy and Closer Ties to Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Van Velthem] Next month Slovenia will be celebrating the fifth anniversary of its declaration of independence in Yugoslavia. As the date draws near, how would you assess your "long march" toward European integration?

[Drnovsek] We quickly succeeded in becoming a member of the Council of Europe as there is no problem in Slovenia regarding observance of democratic principles and human rights. In these areas, we are often cited as an example to other candidates. On the other hand, we encountered more difficulties than expected in establishing closer ties with the European Union. Quite quickly, three years ago already, we signed a trade and cooperation agreement but we are still waiting to sign the association agreement. Italy put obstacles in the way for the reasons you know, and today we are trying to finally resolve this question through a compromise which is acceptable to both parties.

[Van Velthem] But what exactly is the present position regarding the dispute with Rome on the possible return of assets seized by the Yugoslav regime after the war?

[Drnovsek] We have accepted the compromise plan drawn up by former Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana, namely more liberal legislation giving more scope for foreigners to buy real estate in Slovenia. The debate was close in the Slovene Parliament but the government is now free to implement this plan. This is a big step forward.

[Van Velthem] Do you believe the latest change of government in Italy, with the election of a center-left majority, is likely to accelerate the process?

[Drnovsek] We hope so and we believe that this is a positive element as the conflict began under Mr. Berlusconi's government. We therefore view the present change as a good moment to close this chapter. Talks had virtually come to a standstill over recent weeks due to the Italian election campaign and we are relieved to once more have an interlocutor. We even hope to sign the agreement in June, before the end of the Italian presidency of the Union.

[Van Velthem] Has this obstacle course, the slowness of the process, dampened the enthusiasm of the Slovene people for Europe?

[Drnovsek] There was a certain disappointment, it is true, people lost many of their illusions, but you must be pragmatic as complex interests are at stake. Relationships of strength sometimes take precedence over principles and we have to accept this reality. But a very large section of Slovene public opinion remains favorable to Europe. And we are aware that our economic performances, our political stability, and the general health of the country must ensure that we stay among the first group of Central European countries seeking EU membership.

[Van Velthem] Would you be prepared, as some people in the West advocate, to renew privileged economic relations with the other republics of the former Yugoslavia, in particular within a "Balkan common market"?

[Drnovsek] Let us be clear about this: We exclude this possibility. I repeat this to all my foreign interlocutors: Slovenia is no longer part of this group, it has permanently distanced itself from the crisis. Through direct negotiations with the principle creditors (the IMF, World Bank, Club de Paris) we have also settled all our financial obligations in connection with the Yugoslav secession. Slovenia alone paid off 18 percent of Yugoslavia's trade debt.

[Van Velthem] Do you believe the Dayton agreements provide sufficient guarantees for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or would you like NATO troops to stay on after the current mandate expires?

[Drnovsek] The Dayton agreements stopped the war, which was their main objective. There are some in the West who would like Slovenia to draw on its experience and knowledge of the region and become more involved in the process, but what else can we do but follow developments very closely and possibly give some advice? For the future, the return to peace must be consolidated as quickly as possible and, with this in view, I am in favor of an extended IFOR [Implementation Force] presence in Bosnia. Regional stability is far from secured and NATO's continued presence can help achieve this. We favor close cooperation with the Atlantic alliance and we supply NATO with logistic support in Bosnia. But being far from the area, we did not consider it necessary to request NATO bases in Slovenia.

[Van Velthem] The coalition government in Ljubljana has been in crisis since your ally, the Christian Democratic Party, passed a vote of no confidence in Foreign

Minister Zoran Thaler. Does this mark the start of the campaign for the legislative elections next autumn?

[Drnovsek] No doubt. Mr. Thaler and myself are members of the Liberal Democrat Party, which is leading in the opinion polls, and by opening the election campaign very early the opposition is obviously trying to reduce this lead. Another reason is linked to the cause of the no confidence vote itself: The "Solana plan," a necessary step before signing the treaty of association, gave rise to a major debate in Slovenia. Liberalizing the real estate market is a complex procedure, especially in a small country, and MP's accused Mr. Thaler of having failed to obtain immediate international benefits. In fact, the objective reason for this blockage was purely and simply the Italian elections, but the opposition seized this as an excuse.

[Van Velthem] Despite the departure of your allies, you still feel able to complete the government's term of office....

[Drnovsek] We have already stabilized the situation. Looking at it from the positive angle, what happened is an indication of the country's democratic vitality and maturity. We can easily continue until the date set for the next election....

Slovenia: Drnovsek Comments on Talks About EU With Prodi

AU2305162196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 23 May 96

[Report by Edo Zitnik on the visit of Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek to Luxembourg on 23 May—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Drnovsek encountered understanding for our efforts to sign the EU associate membership agreement among his hosts in Luxembourg. As we could understand Luxembourg Prime Minister Junker, Ljubljana can count on this country's support in the European Union and NATO alike.

The Luxembourg prime minister assessed that the bilateral relations between the countries are exemplary, although both sides admitted that there are still unexplored possibilities. This applies especially to finance and banking affairs, which are Luxembourg's trade mark. A delegation of banking and economic experts, which is supposed to realize today's general agreement of the prime ministers, will visit Ljubljana this year. [passage omitted]

From Luxembourg, Prime Minister Drnovsek held a telephone conversation with new Italian Prime Minister Prodi. This was supposedly the first result of his talks

on Monday with EU Commission President Santer. As we could understand Drnovsek, both sides were still interested in the bilateral dispute being resolved as quickly as possible. Drnovsek did not want to say whether he received a sufficiently clear signal in today's talks with Prodi that could be interpreted as the green light for our associate membership. According to Drnovsek, all sides are striving for this, but it nevertheless pays to be cautious.

Drnovsek assessed that the signing was a matter of a political decision of the Italian Government and that Slovenia, by accepting the Spanish compromise—taking into account the electoral situation in the country—did the most that could be done. If the agreement is not signed, Ljubljana will apply for full-fledged membership in the second half of the year, therefore, during the Irish six month EU presidency, by which, although lacking the previous associate membership, it would remain among the most serious candidates for the membership of the Union. Drnovsek does not rule out the possibility of new contacts between Ljubljana and Rome over the next few days, however, these would, at best, only take place at the higher diplomatic level.

Slovenia: Peterle on Candidate for Foreign Ministry Post

AU2305164596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Our country's foreign policy is growing into an increasingly more precarious and intricate matter. Following the dismissal of Foreign Minister Thaler, things are becoming complicated also regarding other personnel. At today's closed session, the State Chamber Commission for International Relations failed to vote on the new Slovene ambassador to Bonn, as, reportedly, a serious deadlock was reached over procedural matters. If the outcome of the vote on the new Slovene ambassador to Germany is negative, the entire structure of candidates for future diplomats, which the coalition has reportedly already coordinated, might collapse. Nadja Pengov interviews Lojze Peterle, president of the Christian Democrats, about this:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] Mr. Peterle, is it true—of course, if you can answer my question—that your candidate for the new foreign minister until the elections is Mr. Friec, who is coming from the ambassadorial post in Bonn?

[Peterle] Since you asked me whether he is the candidate, I will reply negatively. Had you asked who is the candidate, however, I would not have replied at all. Namely, we do not wish to drop any names in public.

which is not the way it is usually done in democratic societies.

[Pengov] The second candidate is Boris Cizelj?

[Peteric] As I have just said, I do not wish to mention any names, however, we will strive so that a man who will be able to secure a majority in parliament will take this post.

[Pengov] When will this become clear?

[Peteric] I expect that the prime minister will be willing to do this soon. The sooner the better for the Slovene state and its foreign policy. [end recording]

Slovenia: Army Shows Off Radars of Undisclosed Origin

AU2205203196 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene
13 May 96 p 4

[Article by Tomaz Bukovec: "Slovene Army Showed New Radar for First Time"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 13 May—A ceremony marking Slovene Army Day was held in Franc Rozman Stane Barracks on Saturday [11 May] at which our army's new arms and equipment were displayed. According to Defense Minister Jelko Kacin, we can expect new presentations over the next few months. In a small parade and subsequent technical presentation visitors had the opportunity to see the new tow trucks for the artillery units and Israel's Tadiran communication system, over which the U.S. Administration had protested; however, few people noticed this first public display of a short-range radar which the Slovene Army has obtained only recently. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 4]

During the parade, members of the 16th Air Defense Battalion also demonstrated the new mobile short-range 2106 HEE radar fixed atop a light transport vehicle. The radar supposedly arrived in the unit a few days ago, and some hints lead us to believe that it was not the only one to arrive in Slovenia recently. Its range is 20 kilometers across and 2,400 meters in height.

Last December, the Defense Ministry announced the purchase of the medium-range radars (with a range of 100 to 120 nautical miles, that is, 160 to 193 kilometers), short-range radars that would be used by the air defense rocket unit, and a couple of radars to cover the radar shadows. The radars were supposed to be purchased in 1996 and 1997; however, the ministry has evidently hurried up.

The 2106 HEE radar is definitely interesting. Some officers claim that it will probably be used to cover the radar shadows; however, it is most likely intended as support for air defense units. The authorized Defense Ministry representatives declined to disclose the manufacturer or the country from which the radar (radars) was imported, which is understandable, in a way. Following the military logic, the radar is truly purely an army piece of equipment and can under no circumstances be labeled civilian. The radar uses the Tadiran control panel, which, however, does not necessarily mean that the radar itself was manufactured in Israel.

The import of this (and other similar radars) is definitely a sign that the arms embargo has been lifted, and this is the first piece of arms (we could say) that was legally imported since the introduction of the arms embargo.

Federal

FRY: Moscow Denies Primakov's Visit Linked to Karadzic

LD2305123996 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1227 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 23 (Interfax)—A senior Russian diplomat, in an interview with Interfax on Thursday, described as "at the least incorrect" attempts to link an official visit by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to Belgrade, tentatively scheduled for May 29-30, to the decision of the future of the leader of the Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadzic.

The source said that some news media reports that during the visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Primakov intends to join the efforts of U.N. and EU special envoy in Bosnia Carl Bildt and some Western countries which are persistently seeking that Karadzic step down as the president of the Serb Republic, and that he be brought to the international tribunal for former Yugoslavia.

In an interview with the independent Yugoslav radio station B-92, Bildt said he intended to ask Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to help arrest Karadzic. For its part, the United States, according to press reports, threatened to impose economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia if the Bosnian Serb leader stays in power.

The date and the subject of Primakov's visit to Belgrade were set in mid-March, said the Russian diplomat. "The two sides agreed that they will not discuss solely the problem of settlement of the Yugoslav crisis," said the source.

According to him, in Belgrade "the two sides will discuss first of all the development of bilateral relations after the suspension of the international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the country's full-scale return to international life."

Under discussion in Belgrade will also be "problems of European and regional security whose most important element is the problem of the Yugoslav crisis."

The diplomat also said that before the visit to Belgrade Primakov will visit Rome where he will meet with Bildt.

The source also said that foreign ministers of the member-countries of the Contact Group on Bosnia, including Russia, the United States, France, Germany and Britain will meet within the framework of the meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, scheduled for June 3-5 in Berlin.

FRY: Talks To Resume on Succession, Division of Assets

LD2305220096 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2031 GMT 23 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, May 23 (TANJUG)—The international community's chief negotiator on succession to and division of assets of former Yugoslavia Sir Arthur Watts will meet with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's negotiating team in Belgrade on May 31.

Watts will come to Belgrade from visiting Ljubljana and Skopje, and will then proceed to Zagreb. [Words indistinct]

There is a chance that all parties to the talks on succession might meet together for the first time in the course of July, which will depend on elements gleaned during the current tour, Watts said in Brussels.

Initial discussions about these problems were held in Brussels earlier in May, with delegations of all five states of former Yugoslavia—Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—paying separate visits.

Watts said the contacts had furnished him with his first, albeit crude information about the complex matter of dividing the assets of the former common state.

The Yugoslav delegation put forth its position that the matter should be considered separately from the question of state continuity and that only questions of economic consequences caused by the secession of republics from former Yugoslavia should be discussed.

Watts has accepted the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's position which, however, differ considerably from the positions held by the other states of former Yugoslavia.

FRY: Agreements on Telecommunications Signed With Skopje

LD2305161896 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1329 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 23 May (TANJUG)—Experts from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] signed protocols and agreed on draft interstate agreements in Belgrade today in the field of telecommunications and radio links and air, road, and rail transport, the Federal Secretariat for Information has announced. [passage omitted]

FRY: National, Balkan News Agencies Discuss Cooperation*LD2305194996 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1729 GMT 23 May 96*

["Balpool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 23 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Vice Premier Nikola Sainovic and a delegation of the Association of Balkan News agencies (ABNA) considered here on Thursday the possibility of exchanging economic information among the national news agencies in the Balkans for the purpose of intensifying regional economic cooperation.

Modalities were agreed on how to establish inter-agency links and jointly distribute economic information to users in Greece, Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.), the Federal Information Secretariat said in an announcement.

ABNA, founded in Sofia on April 28, 1995, rallies the national news agencies of Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Greece, Albania, Macedonia [FYROM—Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.). The ABNA status of official observer is enjoyed by the agencies of Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

Sainovic, who is also Yugoslav minister for the economy, and the ABNA delegation voiced expectations that the national agencies of the remaining Balkan countries would soon join ABNA.

The ABNA delegation comprised ABNA President and Director General of the Greek ANA Agency Andreas Christodoulides, ABNA Coordinating Secretary and Director General of the Bulgarian BIP Agency Stefan Velez, and ABNA Vice President and Director General of the Yugoslav TANJUG Agency Slobodan Jovanovic.

The ABNA delegation was received Thursday also by the Information Minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, Ratomir Vico, who pledged himself for having a Balkan economic service launched at the soonest, since this type information had still been insufficiently present in the regional countries' information media.

In pointing out the importance of establishing information links in the Balkan region, Minister Vico assessed that the 'project of the Balkan information pool is the right way to surmount the situation when until recently the neighbouring countries had been informing one another not directly but via the world's major news agencies.'

Vico said that, in addition to the existing forms of cooperation within ABNA, fresh forms had to be added deriving from apparently significant experience

TANJUG gained while spearheading the pool of the nonaligned countries' news agencies.

FRY: Army Holds Land, Sea, Air Exercise in Montenegro*AU2305184496 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
15 May 96 p 11*

[Article by Jovan Zaric: "Test of Knowledge and Courage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Information Service of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, in accordance with the regular and planned training activities of command structures and units of the Yugoslav Army, exercises involving some parts of the Yugoslav Army are taking place in the region of Podgorica and Boka Kotorska Bay under the name "Laser 21."

The exercise is organized at the tactical level and represents a complex of modern solutions within an integral battle on the tactical depth of the operational direction. [sentence as published]

As military experts say, the engagement of units of the three branches in all three areas of military action—land, sea, and air—enables a dynamic combined activity and requires a very high level of coordination and cooperation.

The goal of the exercise is to present the results of the regular military training, to test the quality of the tactical and combat qualification of some units of all three branches of the Yugoslav Army—the land forces, the air force and antiaircraft defense, and the navy—and to harmonize the criteria for the evaluation of the level of training of commands and units of the Yugoslav Army.

According to the anticipated dynamics, the territory, the range and timespan of the performance, the character of the forces, and the complexity of the operative-tactical requirements, the exercise presents the highest level of exercise activity performed in the Yugoslav Army this year and accords to the plan for the military training of command structures and units.

Integrated exercises involving a representative sample of all three branches of the Yugoslav Army are a recognizable specific feature of the army. They unify the basic idea, combat readiness, and skill of candidates, command teams, and also individuals, together with the technical possibilities of combat systems and means.

According to the plan of activities, this represents a survey of the quality of the regular military training, a test of the tactical and combat qualifications of the units of all three branches that are participating in this exercise.

and the harmonization of the criteria for the assessment of the standards of the commands and units of the Yugoslav Army—that is, it is also an opportunity to assess the ability of command-operative teams to plan, organize, and carry out an integrated military action in complex tactical conditions—in the circumstances that influence the effectiveness of command—and to enable harmonious cooperation and complete success in the preparations for the defense of the country.

At the same time, with this demonstration of the level of training and equipment through a sequence of characteristic actions by a representative sample of its personnel, the Army of Yugoslavia confirms its modernness, from its organization and its modern concept to the harmonization in engagement of its branches and the professional attitude of its personnel.

The final part of the exercise, which will be observed by the members of the Collegium of the General Staff, the commanders of the strategic groups of the Yugoslav Army, and foreign military and diplomatic representatives accredited in Yugoslavia, will be carried out in five stages. In the first stage, navy personnel will demonstrate a defense against an air raid at sea. The second stage will be performed by the members of the Corps of Special Units and will show the blocking, disruption, and destruction of a reconnaissance subversive group on mountainous terrain.

The third stage of the exercise will show aviation support for land troops against an air raid. The fourth stage of this year's biggest exercise of the Yugoslav Army will show the support for land troops, at the army, corps, brigade, and battalion levels, with the use of "Hera" helicopters.

The last, fifth stage will demonstrate an attack by a motorized unit using live ammunition.

FRY: Bank Official Says No Reason To Fear Inflation

LD2305232596 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2256 GMT 23 May 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, May 23 (TANJUG)—A Yugoslav central Bank official said on Thursday there was no reason for fear of inflation, vowing that new money would in the coming period be printed only with hard-currency backing.

Speaking at the Novi Sad spring fair, vice governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia (central bank) Ratko Banovic explained that this meant that every avenue would be explored to channel hard currency into the state coffers.

Banovic said that exporters would fare best in the process, and that support would be given to those among them who sell their hard currency to the central bank, as they would be increasing the state reserves.

There are no plans for printing money for any reason that might give rise to inflation and nobody should expect to obtain credits from this source, he added.

FRY: Banks Allegedly Issue Money Without Authorization

AU2205202596 Belgrade TELEGRAF
in Serbo-Croatian 22 May 96 p 2

[Report by P.T.: "Banks Printing Fake Money Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Only one day after the deputies in the Federal Assembly had relieved Dragoslav Avramovic of his function as governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ], local banks started to issue money without authorization!

As we learned from the Association of Banks, already on Thursday morning [16 May] bank accounts showed a deficit of 100 million dinars, whereas Nikola Stanic, director of Investbanka, explained that his bank alone issued 50 million dinars for the wages of employees of the state railways and the Serbian electric power industry.

On Monday, the account of Investbanka was blocked, which means that its deficit was not covered yet. Therefore a great number of firms that have accounts in this bank were not able to use their money deposited there, so their employees remained without salaries. This actually means that Investbanka used the money of other clients to provide salaries for the employees of those who did not have their own money, or misused funds entrusted to it, reporting them as loans involving a considerably greater amount of money than the actual amount deposits, and a prolonged deadline for payment, which clashes with established customs in banking.

This case shows that two great legacies of the former governor in enforcing financial discipline have already been abolished. The first has to do with the restored tolerance of overdrawn bank accounts, which is the same as the illegal issue of money that thwarted Program 1, due to which the Service for Payment Operations were transferred to the NBJ (because this service tolerated overdrawn accounts, thereby opposing the governor's instructions). The second has to do with the method of payment: Avramovic abolished the practice according to which the Service for Payment Operations was the sole and independent decisionmaker regarding who would get paid, and who would not, in cases when funds were insufficient to execute all

payment orders. The former governor demanded that payments be made by date of orders received.

No matter how much the prime ministers, deputies, leading politicians, and everybody else swore to stick to Program 2, these actions by Investbanka without a doubt show that the program was abandoned only a few days after the removal of the NBJ governor, and that Nikola Stanic, a once very close aide of Avramovic's, has assumed control.

Serbia

Serbia: Workers Protest, Trust Only Avramovic

AU2305205896 Belgrade NASA BORBA
in Serbo-Croatian 15 May 96 p 8

[Commentary by Nada Kovacevic: "What Is a Counter-rally?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The story about counterrallies in Serbia started as early as 1991. "Parents at Usce, Children at Terazije" [parts of Belgrade]—that was written on the title page of BORBA those days. This spring, socialists have held counterrallies at opposition meetings in Nis and Novi Sad, and they were also preparing themselves for the announced demonstrations in Uzice. Exactly when it looked as though people would gather in many towns of Serbia throughout the summer according to a similar scenario—workers came out onto the streets. Local socialist leaders were at a loss. How could they organize a countermeeting in these circumstances?

The workers protested mostly about debts. They even started feeling like "misters," particularly because "mister teachers" and "mister doctors" also threatened with strike, at the same time. This division has been noticed straight away, but it was not easy to organize a countermeeting of "comrades" against "misters."

There were some other ideas too. Considering that workers often mentioned bread in their slogans, it could have been possible to organize a countermeeting of the full against the meeting of the hungry. Fortunately, some people who know history remembered in time that some world revolutions have already started through a conflict of hungry misters and full comrades (the division was just a little bit different).

To avoid confusion, this time opposition is also at a loss because of the protests of workers. They cannot understand at all why all of a sudden there are so many workers in Nis, and—where were they a month ago when the opposition sent them an invitation to take part in the meeting at the main square.

As for the workers, the gentlemen from the opposition also look full to them. That is why they prefer to

organize their rallies by themselves, why they mention no parties, why they trust nobody, and why they have no interest in higher goals, which require further suffering and decay.

The workers invited only Avramovic, the governor [of the National Bank of Yugoslavia] to their meeting. He is not hungry, but it seems that he has no intention of defending the full, and that elicits trust in the people. "I am an old gentleman," he said on Monday to the gathered workers of the IMT [company], obviously aware of the card he was playing.

Regardless of how the events will develop further, both the socialists and the opposition would have to learn a lesson. "One can fake proficiency, but not strength," Mirabo formulated. In the course of the stormy preelection summer, which is before us, it will be very hard to parry the hungry people with strength, particularly if the governor really convinces them that they are gentlemen [sentence as published]. In that case, comrades will really have to think of all those who have remained hungry in the past few years because of them [sentence as published].

Serbia: U.S., Germany Seen as Markets for Arms Industry

AU2405084296 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
17 May 96 pp 10-11

[Article by M. Filipovic: "\$17 Million From Exports"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last year's growth in the production of the metal industry complex of the "Zastava" group was considerable, amounting to between 25 and 280 percent. It is quite probable that such a trend will continue this year as well, and a particular increase is expected in exports, which these producers greatly rely upon.

That is a short summary of the present situation in 10 production facilities from this group (out of a total of 48 firms that this company consists of); at the recently held technical fair, they presented 161 products, 10 of which were new on the market. In this production structure (which does not include the production of cars and spare parts), there is a rich assortment of products for wide-range consumption, work equipment and spare parts.

"The firms from the metal industry complex give significant weight to the entire production of the group 'Zastava,' so that thanks to their results last year's income amounted to 108 million dinars," Slobodan Radovic, vice president of the group "Zastava" for marketing, said at a recent news conference.

Another important characteristic, in the words of Radovic, is that they have used the past period for

the development of new products, which is where their present success originates from. The "Zastava Foundry" ["Zastava livnica"] from Topola realizes 90 percent of its total income from the purchase of those new products alone, IMB from Batocina around 68 percent, "Zastava Utensils" ["Zastava utenzilija"] from Belgrade 36 percent, and "Zastava Tools" ["Zastava alati"] 15 percent [of their total income]. Of course, new developments are also an important part of the business of the most representative firm among them, namely "Zastava Special-Purpose Products" ["Zastava namenski proizvodi"]. In a somewhat smaller percentage, other "Zastava" programs are also bringing new products on the market—"Metal" from Resavica, "Automobil" and "21 October" from Kragujevac, "Auto Parts" from Knic, and "5 September" from Surdulica.

Export of Weapons Most Successful

The latest hits have come from the "Special-Purpose Production:" Semiautomatic pump gun, carbine, and three machine guns; then, from "21 October"—axe ventilators, from "Utensils"—spare parts for bicycles, and also from "Foundry" and "Tolls."

"That part of the Kragujevac company, strengthened with numerous new products this year plans to achieve significant exports, to a value of \$17 million," Radovic said, "which is considerably more than in 1995, when all in all we made 10 million marks. The biggest part of that will be realized by 'Special-Purpose Products,' whose agreed export has reached \$5.5 million, a good part of which has already been realized in the first four months."

The weapons from this plant from Kragujevac, in the first place hunting carbines, small-caliber guns, "pump guns" and CZ-99 pistols have found new buyers. Interest in them is in the first place shown by business partners from the United States and Germany, but also from other countries of the European Union.

Civil Program—for the Far East

"In the placement of the civil program of weapons, we have been oriented to three important markets—those of the United States, western Europe, and the 'rest of the world,'" Vukasin Filipovic, director of "Zastava Special-Purpose Products" says. "It is quite possible that soon a fourth market will be developed, that of the former Yugoslav republics—Macedonia and Slovenia, with which we have already had concrete talks. Already, the weapons factory realizes most of its income from export, so that we have been focused on export products. Foreigners are most interested in revolvers, air guns, and hunting carbines M-70 and M-85, in the production of which we have acquired a world-wide reputation. There

are realistic chances that through business partners from the United States these weapons will for the first time appear on the Far Eastern market."

Montenegro

Montenegro: Liberals Criticize Serb Decision on Airline

LD2405092996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2315 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 23 May (TANJUG)—Late this evening, the Montenegrin Assembly rejected a proposal by the [opposition] Liberal Alliance that parliament approve a resolution on the need for urgent protection of this republic's property and other interests in the field of air transport.

Explaining the above-mentioned resolution, its initiator, deputy Dragan Ivancevic, said that at the beginning of 1992 the Republic of Serbia passed a law establishing a public air transport company which transformed, in an irregular and illegal way, the ownership structure of the former Yugoslav Airlines [JAT], which was an enterprise of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In a five-hour debate on this topic in the Montenegrin parliament, members of all the opposition parties were united in their view that the law establishing the JAT-Beograd public company infringes ownership rights, and that the laws of one federal unit cannot be imposed on another federal unit, as this would be unconstitutional.

In a written statement given to the republic's parliament, the Montenegrin Government expressed the belief that there is no basis for approving the above-mentioned resolution of the Liberal Alliance. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Kosovo: U.S. Office in Pristina Seen as Step to Talks

AU2305180296 Tirana ATA in English 1242 GMT 22 May 96

[Report by B. Jashari]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prishtina, May 21 (ATA)—The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) will start operation in Kosova next month, the newspaper BUJKU of Prishtina [Pristina] reported citing the circles at the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK).

The U.S. State Department decided that a U.S. diplomat from the diplomatic corps in Belgrade, one of the representative offices near Kosova, be sent to Kosova.

BUJKU cited that in a newest geopolitical definition of the Balkans, the U.S. state is the one which has been embarked on a great diplomatic and military work by offering its services, as the mediation which led to the peace accord in Bosnia.

The paper added that because of a policy of presence in Europe, the United States have showed that they are a defensive power in Europe, a role which is worthy of the Kosova case. An authority of a defensive power for all the warring parties avoids the dilemma on who is correct, a distinguishing feature for an authorised mediator in the future negotiations between Belgrade and official Prishtina.

All this, according to the Kosova public opinion, is related to the operation of the USIA office in Pristina, which presents the first step towards the start of negotiations, BUJKU said.

Kosovo: Commentary on U.S. 'Reinvolvement' in Province

AU2305210696 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian
22 May 96 p 1

[Commentary by Lulzim Mjeku: "Waiting for the U.S. Information Agency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Spring this year in Kosova has not been at all late. While the states of Europe lined up to recognize the "FRY," which was interpreted as showing indifference to the cause of Kosova, and after sparks flew at the end of April, the United States has responded to Kosova in the same vein as before. On the international scene, if one expects certain kneejerk responses from European states, it was only the United States that stood by its earlier forecasts about the situation in Kosova. Other politicians who had described the situation in Kosova as "tense, with evident dangers of escalating" and "dangerous for peace in the region" did not hesitate to say after the murders took place that they had not known how true what they said about Kosova had been!

The U.S. reinvolvement in the Kosova crisis is among the appropriate and timely international reactions, as was the visit of Rudolf Perina, the deputy of the assistant U.S. secretary of state, to official circles in Prishtina on 1 May.

Diplomats Daily in the Field in Kosova

This visit indeed reconfirmed the intensification of the U.S. "policy of a greater presence" in Kosova. It was logical to conclude from this visit of the senior official of the U.S. State Department that the already announced office of the U.S. Information Agency would soon open in Prishtina. Some circles in the Kosova Democratic

League [LDK] that are close to U.S. diplomats say that the office will begin work next month.

In any event, the Americans have been a daily presence in Kosova since the middle of April. This U.S. diplomatic presence in Kosova is no doubt in accordance with instructions from the State Department that the terrain of Kosova must not be left without a U.S. diplomatic presence. The fact that the decision to open the office in Kosova was made at a time when the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee led by Republican Senator Jesse Helms is trying to reduce the number of USIA offices is a valuable victory in the struggle for fast and accurate information about the situation in Kosova. Caught between such contradictory demands, the U.S. State Department decided that the nearest representation to Kosova, which is currently the diplomatic corps in Belgrade, should guarantee the presence of at least one diplomat every day on the ground in Kosova. As a senior LDK official said, in practice, this means that the Americans are permanently present in Kosova. Their presence is evident even without the waving of the U.S. flag.

Prishtina Office With Privileges and Diplomatic Status

The Americans are also demanding that all the staff who work in the office in Prishtina have diplomatic status. As Congressman Eliot Engel, chairman of the U.S. Congress committee for the Albanian question, said some time ago, the formal opening of the U.S. office is an event for the Albanians, but also for those who have worked for this cause. On the day that the U.S. office in Prishtina is opened, U.S. Air Force planes with the delegation headed by Congressman Eliot Engel are expected to land at Sllatine airport. There is no doubt that the Americans will finish the work that they have begun and that the U.S. office will possess privileges and diplomatic immunity, while we are also expected to make a genuine contribution.

The great hope of the national public that the office will, in fact, be more [than] an exceptional U.S. diplomatic mission cannot in any way be mere speculation if certain facts are borne in mind. In the latest redrawing of the geopolitical map of the Balkans, it is the United States that has done the most diplomatic and military work, offering its "good offices" of mediation that even brought peace to Bosnia. It is precisely because of its policy of remaining in Europe that the United States has shown that it remains a protective force in Europe, and this title holds good especially for Kosova. The United States' authority as a protective force for all sides in the conflict removed all doubts about who should be the authorized mediator in future talks between Belgrade

and official circles in Prishtina. This matter is, for the public here, tied to the start of the work of the USIA's office in Prishtina, which in fact represents the first push toward the start of the negotiating process. While the USIA continues to wait, those who shape Kosovar policies should look at some issues of domestic policy because these are the foundations for constructing foreign policy.

Kosovo: Serb Refugees From Romania Settled in Klina

AU2305204096 *Pristina KOSOVO DAILY REPORT in English 23 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Over the past days, Serbian-installed authorities in Klina have settled some 60 Serb refugees from Timisoara (Romania) in the premises of the local agricultural cooperative at Budisalc village of Klina.

LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] sources in Klina said Serb settlers have been given jobs in firms in the area, now run by Serbs.

Kosovo: Blaku Calls Repatriation Plans 'Premature'

AU2305163296 *Pristina KOSOVO DAILY REPORT in English 21 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "There cannot be a resolution of the refugee crisis as long as there is no political and equitable solution to the Kosova issue," Dr. Rifat Blaku, chairman of the Commission on Emigration of the Parliament of Kosova, said in a statement for the Kosova Information Center (KIC) today.

The steps Foreign German Minister Klaus Kinkel announced in the aftermath of his meeting last week with President Milosevic of Serbia related to the repatriation of some 120,000 people, most of them Kosova Albanians whose applications for asylum have been rejected, were called premature by Dr. Rifat Blaku, who is also vice chairman of the Parliamentary Party of Kosova (PPK).

"The onesided agreement, reached behind closed doors during the meeting Kinkel had with Milosevic, may result in unprecedented implications for Kosova and the entire region," Dr. Blaku said, noting that the preliminary accord has been reached at a time "conditions for the return of those people have not been created, and the cause of that made them flee in the first place have not been removed." On the contrary, it is now that the Serbian regime has stepped up its repressive practices against Albanians, the chairman of the Commission on Emigration said. This situation of "unbearable tyranny has made the unprotected Albanians to continue seek-

ing refuge elsewhere, mainly in Germany," Dr. Blaku said, calling on the German authorities to review the "premature accord" on the plight of tens of thousands of Kosova Albanians.

"Though we have not information on the modalities of the Kinkel deal for the return of Kosova Albanian asylum-seekers, we hope that it will not turn out to be a deportation of Albanians, a forced movement, but rather an action which will be realized in conformity and spirit with internationally recognized standards," Dr. Blaku said.

The Kosova Parliament Emigration Commission's chairman stated he hoped the German Bundestag, organizations dealing with immigration, and other democratic forces will exert their influence towards reviewing the announced plan for a speedy repatriation of the Kosova Albanians. "We expect that in tackling this problem the German authorities will consult and work closely with the Albanian side in Prishtina," Dr. Rifat Blaku said. The modalities of the repatriation of the Kosova citizens should be sought, while creating the conditions for a normal return, he said, adding that government funds for repatriation as well as other humanitarian sources should be used for job creation and boosting privatization in Kosova, thus assisting a political and comprehensive solution to the Kosova issue.

"The main road towards the resolution of the refugee crisis passes through Prishtina, and not Belgrade," Dr. Rifat Blaku said in an exclusive statement to KIC.

Kosovo: Commentary Plays Down Fear of Repatriation

AU2205155596 *Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 22 May p 1*

[Commentary by E. Azemi: "The Refugees Should Not Fear Repatriation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The question of the repatriation of Albanian refugees to Kosova has become not only the daily topic of European diplomats dealing with this issue. Above all, this question is a concern of Albanians themselves, who should return where they were born. The latest talks between the head of German diplomacy, Klaus Kinkel, and the Serbian authorities in Belgrade defined the final contours of the repatriation of refugees. On this occasion, a deadline was set for when this should be accomplished. The mere presence of Kinkel in Belgrade, and the topic he discussed with those hosting him, was commented on in various ways by the Albanian public. Political assessments by institutions and political parties in Kosova followed. To

the surprise of all, the importance of the nonrepatriation of refugees is stressed in all these reactions, and they are angry with the German Government and other Western governments for being committed to repatriating the refugees. Without ignoring the concern that this repatriation has repercussions of all kinds, be they political, economic, demographic, social, and so forth, it is nevertheless necessary to say that demographic and regional logic should prevail in the political and publicist dictionary. In first place should be mentioned the international right to populate the autochthonous territory and create the conditions in accordance with international conventions related to the repatriation of all those who have violently abandoned their territory. The excessive emphasis of fear over the repatriation of Albanian refugees to Kosova creates a certain disbelief among international institutions, which measure the seriousness of Albanian policy with the way the Kosova institutions themselves approach this problem.

Kosovo: Text of Ruling on Postponement of Elections

AU2305203196 *Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 23 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The parliamentary elections in Kosova, due for May 1996, have been postponed for a year.

Following is the text of the ruling signed by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, today.

"Based on the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova, Amendment III, Item 2, and in agreement with the political parties represented in the Parliament of the Republic, I have decided:

"I. The mandate of the deputies to the Parliament of the Republic of Kosova, elected in the multiparty parliamentary elections on 24 May 1992, is prolonged.

"II. Their mandate will last till 24 May 1997.

"III. Till the Parliament meets (in plenary session), its commissions will continue working as they have done so far.

"IV. This ruling comes into force immediately."

Kosovo: 'Parliament' Urges End to 'Exploitation'

AU2405092196 *Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 23 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The representatives of the Parliament of the Republic of Kosova, responsible for economic and financial issues, and natural resources, discussed in a meeting held 16 May 1996 the economic developments in Kosova in the aftermath its occupation

by Serbia in 1989. They expressed their deep concern about the continuous impoverishment of the natural resources of Kosova, the plundering of its wealth, and the complete destruction of the industrial infrastructure.

The Commission for Economy and Finances and the Commission for Industry, Energetics, and Natural Resources of the Kosova Parliament, called for the attention of the civilized world to an unprecedented colonial exploitation of one state by another, and call on the Belgrade authorities to revoke their colonial policies in Kosova.

The commissions adopted a resolution on the protection of natural resources of Kosova from Serbian colonial exploitation.

"It is an inalienable right of all the peoples to enjoy natural resources in their own territories", the resolution says, noting that international guarantee the sovereign right of every country (nation) to dispose of and administer its natural resources to their best interests. These, and other general resources, are the heritage of indigenous population, the resolution says, and refers to the international documents governing this. "The natural resources of Kosova are the property of the Republic of Kosova and its population, in conformity with former constitutional and legal dispositions of Kosova, and the ones currently in force (the Constitution of the Autonomous Province of Kosova of 1974 and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova of 1990)."

The internationally recognized legal dispositions and guarantees, as well as national constitutional dispositions concerning the full sovereignty of Kosova over its own natural and other resources, have been abused since 1989, when Kosova was occupied by Serbia, the two commissions of the Parliament of Kosova say.

To date, Serbia has adopted 1,360 laws and legislative acts in order to legalize its colonial system over Kosova; the federal status of Kosova was abolished; all its constitutional and political territorial powers were taken over; the Kosova public system was suspended; its natural, industrial and agricultural resources were expropriated; its public economy destroyed; Kosova's banking and financial system and the fiscal sovereignty were illegally appropriated, the resolutions says.

The two commissions call on the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro to bring to an end all talks and business activities with domestic and foreign partners which aim at bargaining the Kosova wealth and natural resources, "for they are the property of Kosova and under exclusive sovereignty of Kosova. Any possible business deals aiming at selling the natural resources of Kosova will

be considered null and void, and will not result in any legal effects."

The Commission for Economy and Finances and the Commission for Industry, Energetics and Natural Resources of the Parliament of Kosova called upon all Belgrade-based diplomatic missions to notify their governments and businessmen of their respective countries to avoid any business deals with the Serbian side aiming at exploitation of the Kosova natural resources until a final resolution of the political status of Kosova is reached. The two commissions called upon the European Union to establish a permanent presence in Kosova in order to monitor this and all other issues.

Kosovo: Antitax Strike by Vendors Continues

AU2305193996 *Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT*
in English 22 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] For almost two months now, some 1,000 Albanian vendors of the Prishtina [Pristina] fresh produce marketplace have been on strike, protesting over the weighty taxes levied on them by the Serbian-installed authorities.

The Prishtina-based newspaper BUJKU said today (Wednesday) that the Serb management of the Prishtina marketplace has issued on 17 May a ruling by which all the vendors who have their own counters in the marketplace will have to pay 100 dinars per day unless they removed them immediately.

Some vendors were allowed over the past years to bring their own counters in the marketplace as there was

enough room, but the management could not afford to provide them.

On 4 April 1996, Albanian vendors of the Prishtina marketplace went on a strike after the Serbian regime had imposed on them taxes without parallel in any town in Serbia, Montenegro, or Vojvodina. The vendors have been contending that they have been levied taxes amounting to 15-20 times higher than in Belgrade, for instance. A vendor has to pay between 800 and 1,200 dinars for a counter in the Prishtina marketplace and an additional 6 per cent of the value of the goods they bring to sell.

Kosovo: Serb Workers Hold Protest Rally in Pec

AU2305191296 *Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT*
in English 21 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A couple of hundred Serb workers of the shoe and leather factory in Peje [Pec] rallied Monday [20 May] in the streets of town to protest over abuses of the Serbian-installed management.

The Prishtina-based [Pristina] Serbian daily JEDINSTVO said the workers demanded they be paid salaries they have not received for several months now, as well as the fulfillment of scores of requests they had put forth to the authorities one year and a half ago. JEDINSTVO quotes Serb workers as demanding the dismissal of the managing board, who, they argued, has been involved in numerous abuses and plundering of the factory's capital.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 382
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. *Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.*

- Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.
- Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.
- Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.